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I. INTRODUCTION
In the nearly century and a half since the Gold Rush era miners began
making California water law, four main doctrinal turning points have
shaped the broad contours of the law governing water allocation and use
in California.' First, based on mining custom, the courts articulated the
prior appropriation doctrine.2 Second, the courts announced that
riparianism also existed in California, and worked out the interrelationship
of the two doctrines. Third, in response to judicial decisions addressing
this interrelationship, the people of the state adopted by ballot initiative a
constitutional amendment that subjected all water rights to a standard of
reasonable, nonwasteful use.4 The courts are still articulating the scope
and effect of this authorization of police power regulation of private water
1. An alternative sketch of California water allocation history might focus on the identity and the
purposes of the parties seeking to allocate water. The formative years, roughly until the beginning of this
century, would have focused on individual water users, first miners, later irrigators. The second major era,
beginning in the first part of this century, and reaching a peak in the 1960's, would be the era of the large water
projects. This era started with large transbasin diversions by cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, and
culminated with the 40 odd year development of the massive state and federal water projects. The third era,
which is still unfolding, is the era of water reallocation. As major stream sites have either been dammed or
placed off limits, water allocation has increasingly become a zero sum game. Ultimately, with the water "pie"
no longer growing, one water user can only increase its share of the pie by a transfer from, or curtailment of,
some other user's share. This era has seen the rise of both public agencies, and nongovernmental organizations,
which have sought to protect public rights to nonconsumptive water uses. As this Article will discuss, in this
new era, the collection of "environmental law" has been the vehicle by which these public rights have been
asserted. In this era of reallocation, economics, particularly the growing pressures from urban water users to
claim a larger share of water heretofore devoted to agricultural uses, also plays a major role in shaping evolving
water doctrine and policy. These economic considerations are most apparent in the emerging statutory law
governing voluntary water transfers. Nevertheless, environmental law currently displays the greatest immediate
potential for forcing large scale involuntary reallocations of water from consumptive uses under private water
rights to nonconsumptive, public uses.
2. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). For a brief discussion of the prior appropriation
doctrine, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
3. See Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886). For a brief discussion of the riparian doctrine, see
infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
4. CAL. CONsT., art. X, § 2. For a brief discussion of Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200
Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926), and the 1928 amendment, see infra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
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rights.5 Fourth, a series of statutes, and administrative and judicial
decisions forced the water allocation system to confront and include what
this Article will call "environmental values." Like the "reasonable use"
doctrine, the impact of these environmental values upon water allocation
and use in California is still evolving rapidly.
Broadly defined, these "environmental values" include protection of a
range of public, generally nonconsumptive water uses. These uses include
public recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, fishing, and ecosystem
preservation.6 Although partial protection to fish has been part of
California law for well over a century,7 the evolution of the legal
recognition and protection of these values has occurred primarily over the
last forty years,8 and most substantially over the last twenty-five years.9
Today, two broad sets of laws addressing these values are relevant to
issues of water allocation. First, legislation and case law mandate
consideration and accommodation of these values within the laws directly
governing water allocation itself.0 Second, broader legislation generally
aimed at environmental matters beyond water allocation itself also impacts
substantially on the water allocation system.'
This Article sketches the broad contours of the intersection of
environmental and water rights law in California. Part II of this Article
outlines the role that environmental considerations play within the statutes
and case law directly governing the acquisition and use of private rights
to water in California. 2 It summarizes the limited role that environmental
considerations historically played in the judicial development of the
appropriation and riparian doctrines. It then outlines the impacts of the
1928 amendment, implementing statutes, and judicial articulation of the
5. See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 572-
73, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 267 (1990) (holding that pre-1914 irrigators are subject to the State Water Resources
Control Board's jurisdiction to enforce the 1928 amendment).
6. E.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1993) (designating certain in stream uses as
"beneficial"); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-41, 658 P.2d 709, 719-24, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 355-61 (1983) (describing water uses protected under the public trust doctrine).
7. See, e.g., 1870 Cal. Stat. ch. 457, sec. 3, at 663-64 (criminalizing interference with fish passage).
8. Starting in the 1950's, the legislature began directing the State Water Resources Control Board to
consider public trust protected values in the water appropriation process. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d
at 443-44, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
9. Between 1968 and 1973, the state and federal governments mandated: 1) Environmental review
legislation, see infra notes 176-195 and accompanying text; 2) endangered species protection, see infra notes
196-216 and accompanying text; and 3) tougher water quality regulation, see infra notes 224-309 and
accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 15-135 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 136-337 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 15-135 and accompanying text.
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public trust doctrine upon the water rights system. Part III of this Article
considers the impact of general environmental laws on that same water
allocation system.'3 It outlines the effects of five sets of statutes upon the
acquisition and use of water in California: 1) Fish protection; 2)
environmental review requirements; 3) endangered species protection; 4)
water quality protection; and 5) wilderness preservation. Part IV of this
Article makes five broad observations. 4 First, in many respects, water
law in California today is primarily environmental law. Second, California
water allocation has become increasingly federalized by the impacts of
federal environmental regulation. Third, environmental considerations are
a major driving force in the current era of water reallocation. Fourth, the
laws governing the California water allocation system are fragmentary and
lack cohesion. Fifth, the implementation of these laws is further clouded
by an almost bewildering array of governmental bodies with some
jurisdiction over, or interest in, water use in California.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTERNAL TO THE
WATER ALLOCATION AND USE SYSTEM
A. Historical Development to 1928
1. Introduction
The legal structure for allocating private rights to water in California 5
evolved in an era when public policy encouraged the almost unfettered
13. See infra notes 136-337 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 338-379 and accompanying text.
15. California recognizes two main classes of private rights to use of surface water appropriative and
riparian rights. WELLs A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 40-67 (1956) (describing a dual
system of water rights). See generally MARYBEU.E D. ARCHIBALD, Appropriative Water Rights in California,
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW (Staff Paper No. 1, 1977); DAVID B.
ANDERSON, Riparian Water Rights in California, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW (Staff Paper No. 4, 1977); William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of California Water
Law, 19 PAC. LJ. 957 (1988) (describing a dual system of water rights). In addition, California recognizes two
other classes of rights to surface waters: prescriptive and pueblo rights. HUTcHiNS, supra, at 299-348 (discussing
prescriptive rights); see id at 256-60 (discussing pueblo rights). The following discussion of surface water rights
focuses on appropriative and riparian rights.
In addition to these private rights to surface water, California also recognizes three classes of rights to
groundwater overlying rights, appropriative rights, and prescriptive rights. HUTCHINS, supra, at 418-514; ANNE
L SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights in California, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW (Staff Paper No. 2, 1977) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights.] For a brief discussion of
the limited role environmental considerations played in the judicial development of California groundwater law,
see infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
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diversion and extraction of water for human use. 16 Developed first in
conflicts among miners,' 7 later in conflicts between irrigators,"8 and
finally in conflicts between hydropower developers and irrigators,' 9 the
appropriation and riparian doctrines addressed relative priorities among
water diverters competing to use a limited supply.20 Judicial decisions
spoke repeatedly of water rights as "vested property" rights.2 Centralized
public participation in the allocation system was virtually nonexistent until
the early part of the twentieth century.22 As they remain today, riparian
rights attach to riparian land and receive no central administration in the
initial allocation decision.23 Until 1914, appropriative rights were largely
16. See, e.g., HurcHiNs, supra note 15, at 11-12.
17. E.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855) (applying the appropriative rights doctrine to a dispute
between two miners).
18. See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886) (reaffirming the applicability of riparian law
to a dispute between irrigators).
19. See, e.g., Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926) (affirming
downstream riparian irrigators' priority in dispute with upstream power plant appropriators).
20. E.g., HurcHNs, supra note 15, at 55-67 (discussing relative priorities between appropriators and
riparians).
21. See Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards Property Rights
in California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031, 1049-60
(1988); see also Brian E. Gray, "In Search of Bigfoot": The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225 (1989) (discussing "reasonableness" limitations
inherent within common law property rights); cf. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the
Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990) (discussing limitations on private property interests in
water).
22. See ARCHIBALD, supra note 15, at 5-7 (noting that not until 1872 did California even establish a
provision allowing appropriators to record their appropriations in the local county recorder's office). The early
recording provisions, however, were not mandatory. Id at 7. Not until 1914 did the state legislature create and
empower the State Water Commission to administer centrally the appropriation of water for all purposes. Id. at
11.
The late 19th century and the early 20th century saw the creation of local public agencies authorized to
operate and construct water projects, and the interest of growing municipalities in developing water projects
beyond their borders. See, e.g., Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360, 368-72, 18 P. 379, 379-81
(1888) (upholding the Wright Act, codified at 1887 California Statutes 29). These developments allowed limited,
local "public" participation in the water allocation process. The reclamation and irrigation districts are best
considered as extensions of private rights holders. The big municipal water projects similarly acted on behalf
solely of their own constituents, with no concerns to the overall state development of water. See NORRIS
HuNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 121-200 (1992) (describing the efforts of San Francisco and Los Angeles
to develop water for their own interests, despite impacts on the areas where the water originated).
23. See ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 2-4 (describing the limited extent of public administration of the
riparian system). Under California Water Code § 2501, the State Water Resources Control Board may quantify
and prioritize riparian rights, including unexercised riparian rights, in a stream system adjudication. See In re
Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 357-59, 599 P.2d 656, 668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350,
361-62 (1979). The State Water Resources Control Board has jurisdiction over the exercise of riparian rights
under California Constitution article X, section 2. People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni,
54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 753, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 858 (1976).
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self-initiated.24 The courts represented the principal public supervisor of
these largely self-administered water development decisions, and they
intervened primarily when one rights holder sued another.' Indeed, the
acquisition of groundwater rights remains largely unregulated even
today.26
In addition to being underrepresented in terms of the identity of the
water allocation players, the public was also largely underrepresented in
terms of the range of values that governed the allocation decisions. Given
the strong public policy in favor of water development for consumptive
uses, public and private use values overlapped substantially during
California's first century. 27 Until the middle of the twentieth century,
however, protection of nonconsumptive, public water uses remained
minimal.28 The public nuisance doctrine,29 reinforced narrowly by the
earliest articulations of the public trust doctrine, provided the principal
means by which public concerns over public access to water, maintenance
of a fishery, and water quality concerns could be raised."0 Again, as with
24. See ARCHIBALD, supra note 15, at 11 (describing limited public involvement in appropriations prior
to 1914).
25. See HtrrcHINs, supra note 15, at 44-53 (discussing the role of the courts in developing Califomia
water law). The legislature's limited early water law efforts included its 1872 effort to establish a water rights
recording system. See ARCHIBALD, supra note 15, at 5-7. In addition, the legislature addressed conflicts between
fishers and other watercourse users. As early as 1852, the legislature enacted the first of several Penal Code
provisions addressing fish passage problems. Joel C. Baiocchi, Comment, Use It or Lose It: Califomia Fish and
Game Code Section 5937 and Instream Fishery Resources, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 431, 433-34 (1980).
Additional legislation addressed fish passage in 1870 and 1915. Id.
26. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing the common law dominated development,
and current exercise, of groundwater law).
27. See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text (describing how judicially developed elements of water
law system encouraged water resource development).
28. ARCHIBALD, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that, initially, the Water Commission's powers to evaluate
the benefits of an appropriation were limited). It took an additional decade after the enactment of the Water
Commission Act before the legislature authorized the Water Commission to consider "the public interest" in its
decision to grant water rights. L The Water Commission interpreted these powers narrowly, at least when an
applicant sought to appropriate water for "domestic uses." National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
3d 419, 427, 658 P.2d 709, 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 350 (1983). Not until the 1950's, when the legislature
enacted the first of several statutes directing the Water Board to consider instream values, did the Board begin
to condition applications. Id, at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
29. See infra notes 170-175 and accompanying text (discussing role of public nuisance in fish protection).
30. The common law granted both riparians and appropriators a right to receive water of suitable quality.
E.g., HtrHlINs, supra note 15, at 122 (describing appropriators' rights to water of adequate quality); id. at 184
(describing riparians' rights to water of adequate quality). See generally ANDERSON, supra note 15. at 67-71
(discussing appropriators' rights to water of adequate quality); Marcia J. Steinberg & Michael Schoenleber,
Salinity Control and the Riparian Right, 19 PAC. L.J. 1143, 1145-54 (1988) (discussing riparians' rights to water
of adequate quality). Thus, a water rights holder affected by an upstream diversion could maintain a nuisance
action. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 116-17, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
178 (1986); cf. Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 379, 121 P.2d 702, 709 (1942) (stating that easements to pollute
are enforceable as between rights holders).
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the allocation system, the courts were the governmental branch responsible
for resolving disputes among these various nonconsumptive or instream
use values.31
2. Appropriative Surface Rights, Riparian Rights, Groundwater
Rights, and Environmental Values
Historically, the legal doctrines governing the allocation and use of
surface and subsurface rights to water in California32 all encouraged water
development at the expense of environmental values. Although the
appropriative and riparian rights doctrines applicable to surface waters
differed in their relative impacts on instream values,33 both ultimately
provided little protection to water quality, and none to fish, wildlife, and
instream, nonconsumptive uses.' While the connection between
groundwater pumping and "instream" values is often unapparent,35
pumping may cause such environmental problems as water quality
In addition to these actions between private rights holders, the courts also recognized the public's ability
to sue under public nuisance to prevent water quality degradation. See, e.g., People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116
Cal. 397, 397-400, 48 P. 374, 374-75 (1897) (upholding nuisance claim against lumbermill discharges that
harmed public fishery); cf People v. Stafford Packing Co., 193 Cal. 719, 728-30, 227 P. 485, 489-90 (1924)
(concluding that public ownership of fish supported a nuisance action for wasteful conversion of edible fish into
inedible byproducts).
Finally, the courts articulated the public's right to get access to navigable waterways. See, e.g., People ex
rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044,97 Cal. Rptr. 448,450 (1971) (concluding that riparian owners
have a right to block nonnavigable body of water); cf Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n, 167 Cal. 163, 138 P. 997
(1914) (discussing riparian rights to nonnavigable streams). The public trust doctrine supported this right of
public access. See, e.g., Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560,568-72, 127
Cal. Rptr. 830, 835-38 (1976) (upholding access right, under public trust doctrine, to watercourses navigable by
pleasure boats for portion of year).
31. Given the absence of any substantial administrative machinery over water rights until the enactment
of the Water Commission Act in 1913, no entity other than the courts could exercise any direct control over
water disputes. See ARCIIAtD, supra note 15, at 9-11 (discussing the enactment of Water Commission Act of
1913); cf 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, secs. 1-46, at 1012-33 (enacting the Water Commission Act); HUTCHINS,
supra note 15, at 94-96 (discussing the Water Commission Act).
32. See supra note 15 (identifying the main elements of California law on the acquisition of private rights
to use water).
33. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing the two systems' individual impacts on
environmental values).
34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting limited common law rights of appropriators and
riparians to water of adequate quality).
35. In many basins, aquifer outflow provides the base flows for interconnected stream systems. W.P.
Balleau, Water Appropriation and Transfer in a General Hydrogeological System, 28 NAT. REOURCES J. 269,
274-78 (1988). Thus, pumping that intercepts outflow may lead to a reduction of surface water available for
diversion or instream uses. For a discussion of the legal doctrines governing interconnected water systems in
California, see HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 515-19.
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deterioration, surface subsidence, and surface vegetation losses. 6 The law
governing private rights to groundwater in California, developed by
analogy to surface rights,37 also encouraged overdevelopment at the
expense of environmental values. 8
Drawing on ancient tradition, the California courts early on labelled all
water rights "usufructs."39 Water rights holders received only the right to
use water; the ownership of the "corpus," i.e., physical particles, remained
in the public.40 At first glance, this distinction between private use rights
and public corpus rights might have supported a strong public ownership
claim to retention of public rights of access to or use of water for
nonconsumptive, instream uses. Nevertheless, the courts determined early
on that the usufructuary nature of the water right came not from a
dedication of rights to retained public ownership interests, but rather from
the user's lack of possession prior to appropriation.4' In other areas, the
sovereign ownership theory has also been largely discredited as a source
of public dominion over private water rights.42
The elements of the appropriation system, as interpreted by the courts,
all encouraged water development at the expense of instream uses. Noted
California water law scholar Wells Hutchins summarized the three
principal requirements necessary to perfect an appropriation as: 1) An
intent to apply water to an existing or contemplated beneficial use; 2) an
actual diversion from the natural channel; and 3) a diligence requirement
- an application of water within a reasonable time.43 As a matter of
semantics alone, the first requirement's "beneficial use" condition was
broad enough to support nonconsumptive, instream uses such as
navigation, hydropower generation, fishery habitat, wildlife habitat,
36. E.g., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA
BULLETIN No. 18-80, 10 (1980).
37. E.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 452-54 (discussing analogous doctrines of correlative rights to
groundwater and riparian rights, and noting that "appropriation" describes any non-riparian, non-overlying water
use).
38. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (outlining interaction of groundwater law and
encouragement of development).
39. E.g., Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1038-42, 1102-05.
40. 1,
41. E.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 36-37; Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n, 167 Cal. 163, 167-68, 138 P.
997, 998-99 (1914) (stating that water in a nonnavigable watercourse is not "public water" in the sense of being
publicly owned; rather, it is simply not yet reduced to possession).
42. E.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 959-60 (1982) (concluding that state ownership of water
is simply a metaphor for state police power to regulate water in the public interest). See also Schulz & Weber,
supra note 21, at 1094-95, n.271 (noting the interplay of state "ownership" theory and public trust doctrine).
43. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 108.
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recreation, and aesthetic enjoyment.4 Nevertheless, the requirement that
water be "applied" suggested that a legally successful appropriation needs
some human effort or activity beyond the passive dedication of water to
an instream use. Moreover, in practice, the cases construing "beneficial
uses" generally spoke of some human economic activity, such as mining,
irrigation, or domestic or municipal uses.45 The second requirement - an
actual diversion - reinforced the appropriation system's emphasis on
human activity and physical control. Water had to be removed from the
stream system in order for the user to obtain an appropriative right. 6
Finally, the diligence requirement, and its accompanying "use it or lose it"
philosophy, made sure that water did not get "locked up" by someone who
was not prepared to divert and use it promptly.47
In addition to these three principal requirements for a successful
appropriation, other features of the California appropriation system also
encouraged water development at the expense of instream values. For
example, the appropriative right's lack of appurtenance to the land both
supported transferability of water rights apart from land transfers, and
allowed water to be transported and used outside of the watershed of
origin." In addition, appropriators could take the full flow of a
watercourse.4 9 Finally, domestic and irrigation uses were recognized as
the most preferred uses.50
44. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1243.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994) (legislating that certain
instream uses are beneficial); cf ANNE 1. SCHNEIDER, Legal Aspects of Instream Water Uses in California,
GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REvIEw CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW 1 (Staff Paper No. 6, 1977) (listing
beneficial instream uses) [hereinafter, SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses].
45. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 145-50 (summarizing beneficial use cases).
46. See Fullerton v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590,600-02, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 518, 525-27 (1979) (holding that physical control over water was needed to perfect appropriative right).
47. See HUTCHINs, supra note 15, at 88 (discussing diligence requirement under common law); id at 94
(stating "diligence is of the essence of priority" under the 1872 Civil Code's water appropriation system); id.
at 116-18 (considering the diligence requirement); id. at 285-98 (discussing loss of appropriative rights through
abandonment and forfeiture); cf. ARCHIBALD, supra note 15, at 27-29 (tracing diligence requirement to miners'
customs and noting its scope under contemporary permit system).
48. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 70 (noting that appropriator need not own title to land); id. at 125
(describing separability of title to water and land); id. at 142-43 (noting appropriator's rights to divert water from
one watershed to another).
49. Id. at 134-35.
50. Id. at 105. The Water Code continues to elevate these two uses over all others. CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 105, 1254 (West 1971). Contemporary courts have not interpreted those priorities as absolute guarantors of
rights to divert for human consumption at the expense of fish. See, e.g., California Trout, Inc. v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 585,622-24,255 Cal. Rptr. 184,206-08 (1989) (finding ironic the City
of Los Angeles' interpretation of a statutory prioritization of water uses in the case before it, especially when
contrasted to National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court).
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The riparian system also encouraged water development at the expense
of instream values. Like the appropriation system, the riparian system
established a private party's rights to divert water for beneficial uses.5'
No riparian owner had the right to demand undiminished streamflow
simply to satisfy aesthetic concerns. 52 Nevertheless, six differences from
the appropriation doctrine reduced the potential environmental impact of
riparian diversions upon surface watercourses. First, except for temporary
storage for power generation or mill equipment propulsion, the riparian
right generally did not encompass storage of water in reservoirs behind
dams.53 Second, except in limited instances, no one riparian right holder
could likely divert the full flow of the stream.54 In combination, these two
requirements effectively forced proponents of large water development
projects to appropriate water for their projects. Third, unlike the
appropriation doctrine, the riparian doctrine did not include a "use it or
lose it" philosophy; unexercised riparian rights remained potent though
dormant.55 This difference alleviated the pressure on riparian owner to
irrigate or otherwise develop as quickly and as extensively as possible.
Fourth, the riparian right remained tied to the land, thereby reducing the
transferability of the right and restricting the ability to use water out of the
watershed of diversion.56 Fifth, as the right was correlative 5 and
unquantified,8 it provided less certainty than an appropriative right.59
Everything else being equal, lack of certainty would tend to discourage
risky or expensive development projects. Finally, the courts have indirectly
51. See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 220-22,235-47 (describing "beneficial use" requirements under
riparian doctrine).
52. Id. at 245.
5K ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 21-22.
54. HtrrcRNs, supra note 15, at 228; cf id. at 236 (noting that upper riparian may divert full stream flow
for specified "natural" uses).
55. AiDERSON, supra note 15, at 61-67; cf. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d
339,358-59,599 P.2d 656,668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350,361-62 (1979) (holding that, in streamwide adjudication,
State Water Board may give dormant riparian rights a lower priority than appropriative or presently exercised
riparian rights).
56. See HUTCHINs, supra note 15, at 187-203 (discussing incidence of riparian right as "part and parcel"
of the riparian land, and describing the place of use restrictions); CLIFFORD T. LEE, The Transfer of Water Rights
in California, GOVERNOR'S COMMIssioN TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW 24-25 (Staff Paper
No. 5, 1977). In practice, riparians can "transfer" their water rights to nonriparian uses by executing a covenant
not to sue an appropriator who diverts water otherwise within the riparian right. Lee, supra, at 25-26.
57. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 29 (describing "correlative" rights as "measured by the equal rights of
the other riparian owners along the stream"). In times of shortage, all riparian owners must reduce their water
use. Id.
58. Lee, supra note 56, at 12-13.
59. Id. at 12-14.
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recognized some watercourse preservation interests as valuable "beneficial
uses" protected by the riparian doctrine.60
The law governing groundwater fights in California developed by
analogy to surface water rights.6' Owners of land overlying a groundwater
basin have correlative fights analogous to riparian rights.62 Nonoverlying
owners may obtain appropriative fights to the water surplus to the
overlying owners' needs.63 When overpumping occurs, prescriptive fights
may arise.'
To the extent that the broad contours of groundwater law mirror
surface water law, similar pro-development biases resulted as the doctrines
evolved. In two ways, however, these biases became even more
pronounced with groundwater. First, much of the common law
inadvertently encouraged a "race to the pumphouse,"6' with the
consequence of overpumping in many basins. 66 Second, unlike the
appropriative fights system, there remains even today no centralized
administration of groundwater fights and use in California.67 Although the
State Water Board has authority to protect groundwater quality,68
common law adjudications between private fights holders represent the
60. City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460,474-75, 52 P.2d 585, 592 (1935) (holding that
lakeshore property owners were entitled to just compensation for diminution of littoral rights resulting from the
lowering of Mono Lake's level by water diversions); see City of Elsinore v. Temescal Water Co., 36 Cal. App.
2d 116, 129-30, 97 P.2d 274, 280-81 (1939) (stating that recreational uses were beneficial under the state
constitution, and concluding, under the circumstances, that lakeshore community could enjoin diversions that
lowered lake's level); cf. Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 561-62, 150 P.2d 405, 412 (1944) (concluding that
water used by resort for "swimming pools... and boating" was within the riparian right, even if not entitled
to the domestic use priority).
61. E.g., HurcHINS, supra note 15, at 452-54 (discussing analogous doctrines of correlative rights to
groundwater and riparian rights, and noting that "appropriation" describes any non-riparian, non-overlying water
use). See generally id. at 418-514 (tracing contours of groundwater law); SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights, supra
note 15 (summarizing California groundwater law).
62. SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights, supra note 15, at 5-6.
63. Id. at 14-16.
64. Id at 19-22.
65. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 267, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299, 123
Cal. Rptr. 1, 50 (1975) (noting that by concluding that each pumper who pumps more than his or her share in
an overdrafted basin obtains prescriptive rights against all other pumpers, the California Supreme Court had
inadvertently encouraged each pumper to pump as much as possible in order to maximize his or her prescriptive
rights).
66. E.g., SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights, supra note 15, at 36 (discussing the "mutual prescription
doctrine").
67. Id. at 1-3.
68. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100-2101 (West 1971) (authorizing State Water Board to initiate
adjudications to preserve water quality); see also it § 13050(e),(j) (West Supp. 1994); id. § 13806 (West 1992)
(including groundwater within the Porter-Cologne Act's water quality planning process).
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main arena for public involvement in groundwater allocation.69 While
groundwater rights law is articulated in a manner that would include
environmental constraints as a potential limitation on private rights to
pump, the case law has not developed yet in this area.
70
B. Three Landmark Developments Allow Greater Public Control and
Consideration of Environmental Values in the Water Allocation
Process
If the first seventy-five years of development of California water law
represented minimal state involvement in the water allocation process and
maximum encouragement of private development of water resources, three
developments in the last sixty-five years have substantially changed both
the public's role and the consideration of environmental values in the
water allocation and use system. In tandem, the 1928 addition of article X,
section 2, to the California Constitution,7 and the 1983 articulation, in
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,72 of the relationship of the
public trust doctrine to the appropriation system, have changed water
resources playing field.73 A third development - the rise of the big
69. SCHNEIDER, Groundwater Rights, supra note 15, at 3; cf CAL WATER CODE § 10753 (West Supp.
1994) (authorizing specified local agencies to manage groundwater).
70. According to the California Supreme Court, a groundwater basin is overdrafted when the extractions
from it exceed its "safe yield plus any... temporary surplus." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,
14 Cal. 3d 199, 280,537 P.2d 1250, 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 60 (1975). "'Safe yield' is defined as 'the maximum
quantity of water which can be withdrawn annually from a ground water supply without causing an undesirable
result.' The phrase 'undesirable result' is understood to refer to a gradual lowering of the ground water levels
resulting eventually in depletion of the supply. [Citation omitted.]" Idl at 278, 537 P.2d at 1308, 123 Cal. Rptr.
at 59. These definitions are couched primarily in terms of supply for rights holders' extraction. See id. at 277,
537 P.2d at 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 58. Nevertheless, at least as a matter of semantics, nothing in this
formulation of "safe yield" would preclude an environmental "undesirable result" from triggering an overdraft.
Such an environmental trigger might include surface subsidence or surface vegetative losses.
By including undesirable "environmental" results as a threshold for triggering overdraft, a sufficiently
motivated private groundwater rights holder could sue to adjudicate basin pumping and cut off the acquisition
of prescriptive rights. The complexity, expense, and uncertainty of groundwater adjudications are a likely
disincentive to any rights holder's initiation of such a suit. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGmS LAW, FINAL REPORT 158-61 (1978). It is uncertain whether a citizen who was not a rights
holder could sue to prevent environmentally triggered overdraft on anything other than a public nuisance theory.
Even that doctrine might pose standing problems. See Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 10,
20, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1989) (restating the traditional rule that, to have standing to raise public nuisance,
private citizens must also show that the acts complained of are also a private nuisance to them).
71. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. The amendment was originally enacted as Article XIV, section 3. Schulz
& Weber, supra note 21, at 1065-66 n.167. Except for renumbering in 1976 and changes in several gender
preferences, the current version of the amendment is identical to the version passed in 1928. Id.
72. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
73. E.g., Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1065 (noting the role of 1928 amendment and the public
trust doctrine in reshaping California water law).
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federal and state water projects74 - has also changed the water allocation
and use dynamics. As public demands for increased consideration of
environmental concerns have grown in the last twenty-five years, the
increased power of the public over even past water allocation decisions has
virtually halted further development of water supplies and begun to shift
water from consumptive to environmental uses.75
The passage, in 1928, of the constitutional amendment now known as
article X, section 2, exemplified the first major paradigm shift away from
unfettered common law rights.76 In its historical context, the amendment's
additions to California water law initially seemed modest. By evaluating
all water rights under criteria of "reasonableness" and "wastefulness, '77
the amendment overturned the California Supreme Court's 1926 decision
in Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co. 78 In Herminghaus, the
court had allowed downstream riparian flood irrigators to demand that the
San Joaquin River's peak flows reach their lands virtually unimpeded, even
though only a tiny fraction of the streamflow would actually overflow the
river banks and flood irrigate the field.79 The 1928 amendment expressly
restricted riparian rights to "no more than so much of the flow thereof as
may be required or used consistently with [this amendment]."80
74. See CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA'S RIVERS 40-41 (1993) (describing the state
and federal water projects) [hereinafter STATE LANDs COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S RIVERS]; CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF
WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (FUTURE, BULLETIN No. 160-87, 39-51)
(1987) (describing current operations and possible expansion plans for state and federal projects) [hereinafter
BULLETIN 160-87].
75. For example, the 15-year dispute over the City of Los Angeles' diversions from the Mono Lake basin
- the diversions at issue in National Audubon Society - has recently resulted in the City's decision to reduce
its diversions permanently in exchange for state assistance in constructing waste water reclamation facilities.
Mara Cone, Pact To Cut Diversions From Mono Lake, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 14, 1993, at B5.
76. See Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1065-71 (discussing circumstances accompanying the
amendment's enactment). The legislature had begun the process of exercising public control over water rights
15 years earlier, with the passage of the Water Commission Act. 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, secs. 1-46, at 1012-33
(enacting the Water Commission Act). That Act took effect in December 1914, after a public referendum.
HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 94-96 (discussing the Water Commission Act). The 1928 amendment continued
the process of public control over water in two prominent ways. First, unlike the Water Commission Act, which
applied only to appropriations initiated after its effective date, the 1928 amendment applied a general
reasonableness criteria to all water users, regardless of the date of the right's inception. See ARCHIBALD, supra
note 15, at 17 (noting inapplicability of permit system to pre-1914 appropriators); HrrlHiNS, supra note 15, at
16-19 (discussing amendment's application to all water rights). Second, it elevated the state's police power
concerns over water development and use to constitutional stature.
77. The amendment requires that water uses, methods of use, and methods of diversion, all meet the
reasonableness criteria. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2, cL. 2.
78. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926).
79. Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison, 200 Cal. 81, 93-97, 252 P. 607, 612-13 (1926). The court
found that, between the riparian irrigators and a prospective upstream appropriator, no reasonable use rule
restricted the riparian use. Id.
80. CAL. CoNsT. art. X, § 2, cl. 3 (West Supp. 1994).
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Although undoubtedly unintentional,81 Herminghaus had the effect of
preserving large quantities of water in a major portion of the San Joaquin
River."2 By elevating downstream riparians' rights over those of upstream
appropriators, both Herminghaus and Fall River Valley Irrigation District
v. Mount Shasta Power Corp.,8 3 a case decided a few months after
Henninghaus, preserved water within upper portions of a watercourse.'
Initially, judicial interpretations of the 1928 amendment encouraged
water development at the expense of instream valuesY For example, the
application of the amendment to the circumstances of the Herminghaus
case itself demonstrated the pro-development effect of the amendment.
81. Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Herminghaus frame their arguments in terms of the
relative rights and consumptive use values of the riparians and would-be appropriators. See Herininghaus, 200
Cal. at 100-05, 252 P. at 615-17 (majority opinion); id. at 122-27,252 P. at 624-26 (dissenting opinion). Neither
opinion discusses the relative values of keeping the water instream, or of the environmental consequences of the
appropriators' intended dam.
82. The dam proposed in Herninghaus does not appear to have been tied into an irrigation works; thus,
the project would not necessarily have reduced total annual waterflows in the river. Nevertheless, the dam would
have greatly reduced the spring peak flows. In recent years, state policy makers have emphasized the role that
such peak flows play in the ecosystem. See CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WAT.R
RIGHTS DECIsION 1630 at 33-34 (Draft Nov. 17, 1992) [hereinafter, D-1630 (DRAFr)](setting pulse flows); id.
at 37-38 (setting attraction flows); CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMMISSION, DELTA-ESTUARY: CALIFORNIA'S
INLAND COAST 38-43,78, 91-92 (1991) (noting in passim relationships between flow rates and times, and fishery
needs) [hereinafter STATE LANDS COMM'N, DELTA-ESTUARY].
Even if the particular dam involved in Herminghaus merely regulated streamflows, the result in
Herminghaus would have allowed downstream riparians to block upstream consumptive diversions. Thus, in
either scenario, Herminghaus would have preserved instream flows at least until riparian irrigators made their
own diversions.
83. 202 Cal. 56, 259 P. 444 (1927). In Fall River Valley, the court upheld the rights of downstream
riparian hydroelectricity developers to call streamflow at the expense of upstream appropriator irrigator. Id. at
58-65, 259 P. at 445-48.
84. The unintended consequence of preserving instream flows for downstream users as against upstream
hydropower projects could well have been simply an accident of land settlement patterns. As between riparians
and appropriators, seniority generally depends upon the dates that the two rights arose. See Hutchins, supra note
15, at 61-62 (discussing relative priorities). Riparians who trace their title to Mexican land grants have an
effective date of 1850; riparians who trace their title to a federal land patent look to the date of the original
patentee's actual settlement with an intent to acquire title by patent. See Anderson, supra note 15, at 46-47. Pre-
1914 appropriative rights date to the time that water was first diverted and applied to a beneficial use. Id. at 46.
Post-1914 appropriations date to the time that the appropriator applied for a permit to appropriate water. Id.
Thus, where central valley or Sierra foothill farmers could trace their land titles to a 19th century federal patent
or even a Mexican land grant, their riparian rights would have priority over those upstream appropriators whose
diversions for hydropower generation were not begun until the early twentieth century brought demands for
electric power.
For a detailed discussion of the history of California water development, and accompanying land use
consequences, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, see NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 64-117
(1992).
85. See, e.g., Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 700, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933) (decrying the
wasteful practice of allowing water to waste into the sea, unused). But see City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10
Cal. App. 2d 460, 474-75, 52 P.2d 585, 592 (1935) (concluding that maintenance of lake's level "in its natural
condition" is "reasonably beneficial").
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After the passage of the 1928 amendment, the downstream riparian
irrigators in Herminghaus would have had no right to command one-
hundred percent of the San Joaquin River flows in order to use one percent
on their lands.86 Since downstream riparians no longer had an absolute
right to block upstream appropriators, those appropriators could build their
dams with greater impunity.
Chow v. City of Santa Barbara,87 decided shortly after the 1928
amendment's enactment, demonstrated that the amendment was designed
to facilitate development of water projects. In Chow, the California
Supreme Court decried the wasteful practice of allowing water to waste
"into the sea ... lost to any beneficial use."8  The court left no doubt
that the amendment exemplified the strength of the state's police power to
help develop the waters of the state, "the very life blood of its
existence."89
Until recently, the cases construing the 1928 amendment have generally
involved challenges by one water user or developer to another water
developer's use.90 More recently, cases have begun to develop two often-
interrelated propositions. First, the courts have begun to recognize that the
1928 amendment may support reservation of water for instream or other
86. See Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison, 200 Cal. 81, 128, 252 P. 607, 626 (1926) (Shenk, J.,
dissenting) (noting the relative proportion of San Joaquin River underflow necessary to lift small fraction of
water over river banks for actual irrigation of plaintiff riparians' lands).
The 1928 amendment would not likely have impacted Fall River Valley, since that case did not involve
"greedy or selfish" riparian owners who were attempting to call the entire streamflow to provide hydraulic lift.
Fall River Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 202 Cal. 56, 64, 259 P. 444, 448 (1927); see
Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1060 n.142.
87. 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
88. Chow, 217 Cal. at 700, 22 P.2d at 16 (1933). In Peabody v. City of Vallejo, the court tempered its
"wastefulness" evaluation. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). It noted that
"reasonableness" and "waste" depended on the circumstances of a given case. Id. at 368, 40 P.2d at 492. It
further recognized that in areas of relative water abundance conservation was unnecessary, and implied that water
there could properly flow "freely to the sea." Id. However, the court pointed out that these water rich areas of
the state were "few in number." Id. By implication, in less water rich areas, the flowing of water to the sea
unused by humans was wasteful. In neither circumstance did the court consider the environmental consequences
of water development. Cf Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 448, 90 P.2d
537, 548-49 (1939) (stating that allowing water to flow to the sea was not wasteful until need developed for it).
89. Chow, 217 Cal. at 702, 22 P.2d at 16.
90. E.g., Joslin v. Mafin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 149, 429 P.2d 889, 900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377,
388 (1967) (holding, in a suit between reservoir operator and gravel miner, that use of water for gravel
deposition was unreasonable); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 934-35, 207 P.2d 17, 33-
34 (1949) (holding, in a suit between two groundwater rights holders, that one city's failure to capture certain
waters for groundwater recharge was not waste) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950); Rancho Santa Margarita v.
Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501,558-59, 81 P.2d 533, 562 (1938) (holding, in a suit between riparians, court should search
for physical solution to prevent waste); cf Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 159 Cal. App. 3d 185, 198-99,
205 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1984) (involving individual's suit against irrigation district for wasteful practices).
See generally Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1071-93 (discussing reasonableness cases).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
environmental uses. For example, in United States v. State Water
Resources Control Board (Delta Water Cases),91 the court cited the
amendment to support the State Water Board's power to reconsider prior
water allocation decisions in order to prevent impairment of water
quality.92 Similarly, in California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources
Control Board (Cal. Trout 1)93, the court upheld, under the 1928
amendment, a construction of Fish and Game Code section 5946 that
required minimum instream flows for preservation of fish in certain
streams in the Mono Lake basin.94 Second, as demonstrated by the Delta
Water Cases, the courts have used the 1928 amendment to support greater
public control over water allocation decisions. 95
91. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). Some commentators, including the author, have
referred to this case as "Racanelli," after its author. Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1091 n.257. Upon further
reflection, "Delta Water Cases" provides a more descriptive name that avoids personifying the case through its
author. See Gray, supra note 21, at 234 n.4l (recommending the name Delta Water Cases).
92. United States v. Water Resources Control Bd. ("Delta Water Cases"), 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (1986). The record before the court, however, precluded its consideration of the validity of
the particuiar conditions to protect water quality the Board had placed upon permit holders. Id. at 130, n.24, 227
Cal. Rptr. at 188 n.24.
The Board had conditioned the junior appropriators' rights in order to protect senior rights holders from
impairments of their water rights from increased salinity. Id. at 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187-88. The appellate
court's opinion, however, did not limit the Board's power, under article X, section 2, to protect water quality
to only those occasions when a senior rights holder is threatened. Rather, the court's language sweeps much
more broadly. The court concluded: "The Board's power to prevent unreasonable methods of use should be
broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the proper balance between the interests in water quality and
project activities in order to objectively determine whether a reasonable method of use is manifested." Id.
93. 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989). This case, known as "Cal. Trout I," was the first
of two cases involving the impact of the California Fish and Game Code upon the City of Los Angeles'
diversions in the Mono Lake basin. The second case was California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control
Bd. (Cal. Trout 11), 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1990).
94. Cal. Trout 1, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 622-25, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 206-08. Section 5946 forbids the State
Water Rights Board to issue any permit or license for water appropriation in the Mono Lake basin after
September 9, 1953, unless the applicant has fully complied with Fish and Game Code § 5937. CAL. FISH &
G. ME CODE § 5946 (West 1984). Section 5937, in turn, requires dam owners to pass sufficient water "to keep
in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the dam." Id. § 5937; see infra notes 144-160 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fish and Game Code provisions).
95. See generally Ronald B. Robie, The Delta Decisions: The Quiet Revolution in California Water
Rights, 19 PAC. LJ. 1111, 1111-42 (1988) (discussing the Delta Water Cases); cf Schulz & Weber, supra note
21, at 1091-93 (discussing the Delta Water Cases). Other cases in which the State Water Board has acted under
the authority of the 1928 amendment include People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 743, 748-51, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851,854-56 (1976) (examining the reasonableness of riparians' use of Napa
River water for vineyard frost protection), and Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
(I1D lI, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 573, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 267 (1990) (holding that pre-1914 irrigators were
subject to State Water Board jurisdiction to prevent waste).
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The second main paradigm shift of the twentieth century occurred with
the 1983 decision -in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court.96 In
that case, the California Supreme Court integrated the public trust doctrine
with the appropriative rights system.97 Prior to that case, California courts
had articulated and applied the public trust doctrine largely in the context
of tidelands ownership and access to navigable waterways.98 Those cases
spoke of the state's limited ability to alienate trust-bound tidelands, and the
public's broad access to navigable waters for fishing, boating, hunting,
commerce, recreation, and ecological concerns. 99 A decade after the court
decided National Audubon Society, the precise contours of the integration
of the public trust and California water allocation system remain as
uncertain as they did when originally decided."0 Nevertheless, the
doctrine's twin broad assertions of manifest and continuing public control
over water allocation, and mandatory consideration, and reconsideration,
of trust uses in water allocation decisions, now seem well entrenched in
California water law.101 Although these trust uses are not without
96. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983). See Arthur L. Littleworth, The Public Trust
vs. the Public Interest, 19 PAC. LJ. 1201, 1201-23 (1988) (criticizing public trust doctrine). See generally STATE
LANDS COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S RIVERS, supra note 74 (evaluating rivers under a variety of public trust criteria);
STATE LANDS COMM'N, DELTA-ESTUARY, supra note 82 (evaluating Delta under a variety of public trust
criteria).
97. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 448, 658 P.2d 709, 726-29, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 362-66 (1983).
98. E.g., Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1095-97.
99. Id.; National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 443-40, 658 P.2d at 719-24, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355-60.
100. In the 1988 Pacific Law Journal California Water Law Symposium, this author described three of
the questions left open by NationalAudubon Society. Schulz & Weber, supra note 21, at 1098. These included:
1) The doctrine's impact on other water rights within the state, such as riparian or groundwater rights; 2) the
doctrine's lack of criteria for allocating the burden of diversion reductions or other operational changes among
multiple water rights holders on a watercourse; and 3) the doctrine's lack of criteria for triggering a judicial or
administrative reevaluation of a prior public trust determination. Id. To date, no reported case has addressed any
of these issues.
In Golden Feather ConunityAss'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276,257 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1989), the court addressed the doctrine's applicability to one question left open by National Audubon
Society. In National Audubon Society, the court did not address the doctrine's applicability to nonnavigable
bodies of water that do not themselves affect navigable waters. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 437
n.19, 658 P.2d 709, 721 n.19, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 357 n.19. In Golden Feather, the court concluded that, unless
the nonnavigable waters are affected by the tide, the doctrine does not apply to nonnavigable streams that do
not themselves affect navigable waterways. Golden Feather, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1283-86,257 Cal. Rptr. at 840-
43. The court refused to allow plaintiffs to raise the doctrine to compel an appropriator to continue diversions
into storage so that the public could use the reservoir for recreation. Id.
101. Under National Audubon, the courts and the State Water Board share concurrent jurisdiction over
public trust issues. National Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 448-51, 658 P.2d at 729-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68. In
making an initial decision to allocate water, the State Water Board has an affirmative fiduciary duty to take
public trust values into consideration "and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses
protected by the trust." Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364. While the State Water Board may
"have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses," no private rights holder can
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ambiguity,"° they include such instream values as promotion of
navigation, fishing, hunting, commerce, aesthetics, recreation, and
preservation of ecosystems in their natural state."0 3 While no drop of
water as yet appears to have been permanently reallocated by judicial or
administrative application of the doctrine, it has prompted extensive
reviews of water practices throughout the state.' 4
The third major development in California water allocation and use
over the last three quarters of a century has been the rise of the large
federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP).
Collectively, these two projects can divert nearly 10 million acre feet per
year. 05 Total federal and state diversions represent over forty percent of
annual surface water diversions in California." As water development
obtain a vested right to "appropriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the trust." Id. at 445-
46, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. Thus, the state "retains continuing supervisory control" over
its navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters." Id.
102. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408,421-22,432 P.2d 3, 12-13,62 Cal. Rptr. 401,410-11
(1967) (holding that the state had power to promote one trust use-commerce over another trust use-navigability;
a bridge was permitted to obstruct a waterway). Cf. NationalAudubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 439 n.21, 658 P.2d
at 722 n.21, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.21 (discussing Colberg).
103. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
104. To date, no water appears to have been permanently reallocated under the public trust doctrine. The
State Water Board has cited the public trust doctrine to justify some of its actions. See, e.g., D-1630 (DtAFr),
supra note 82, at 1 (stating that public trust doctrine authorizes imposition of ecological impact fees and justifies
diversion reductions); see 3 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 170-171 (June 1993) (discussing the final version
of order). It has not yet, however, finally implemented any decision that reduces diversions or orders water
releases from storage in order to protect trust uses. Cf CAL CODE REGS. tit 23, § 780(a) (1993) (reserving State
Water Resources Control Board jurisdiction, pursuant to public trust power, in appropriation permits and
licenses).
The Mono Lake processes appear to be closest to an actual permanent water rights change on trust grounds.
A preliminary injunction has been in place for several years now, requiring the City of Los Angeles to allow
enough water to enter the lake to maintain its level at 6377 feet above sea level. 1 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y
RPTR. 116 (Mar. 1991). The State Water Board has been reviewing the Mono Lake basin for several years now,
and has released a draft Environmental Impact Report on water diversions from that basin. Hearings on Mono
Basin Water Reallocation Begin, 4 CAL. WATER L. & POLICY RPTR. 39, 39-40 (Dec. 1993). It is unclear how
the recent agreement by the City to permanently reduce its diversions from the basin will impact the 15-year
legal proceedings. See Marla Cone, Pact To Cut Diversions From Mono Lake, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 14,
1993, at B5 (reporting recent agreement).
In addition to these developments, the public trust doctrine has prompted numerous administrative
challenges to dams and diversions on a variety of streams throughout the state. See, e.g., 4 CAL. WATEP L. &
POL'Y RPTR. 9 (Oct. 1993) (noting that State Water Board is considering public trust values in fishery below
Big Bear Lake); 3 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RPmR. 91 (Feb. 1993) (noting that State Water Board is conducting
public trust hearings on Mokelumne River fishery); 2 CAL. WATER L. & POLy RPrR. 31 (Nov. 1991) (citing
inter alia limited powers and resources for protecting the public trust, State Board dismissed public trust
complaint on Alameda Creek).
105. BULLETM 160-87, supra note 74, at4O. Additional federal sources total 1.3 million acre-feet per year.
Id. The combined federal and state projects supplied over 30 percent of the state's annual water needs as of 1985
and formed over 40 percent of total surface water diversions as of that year. Id
106. Id.
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projects of almost unparalleled dimension, they have had an enormous and
largely detrimental impact on the environment.'O° Nevertheless, as
government operations, at least in theory, these two projects can respond
more directly to state or national political considerations than private or
locally owned projects. These broad based political factors can include
public calls for greater environmental protection.'0 8
C. Consideration of Environmental Values Within the Contemporary
Surface Water Rights Allocation System
In combination, the 1928 amendment and the public trust doctrine
sketch the general backdrop for consideration of environmental values
within the contemporary water rights allocation system. Against this
backdrop, the Legislature has detailed specific "public interest" matters that
the State Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) must
consider when reviewing applications to appropriate water. " The
107. Harrison C. Dunning, Confronting the Environmental Legacy of Irrigated Agriculture in the West:
The Case of the Central Valley Project, 23 ENVTL. L. 943, 950-57 (1993) (describing CVP's negative
environmental impacts).
108. For example, the 1992 passage of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) has greatly
changed the operational criteria for the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project. See Central Valley
Project Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. Law No. 102-575, § 3406(a), 106 Stats. 4714 (1992). For the first time,
that act has added fishery and wildlife protection to the stated project goals, placing those two goals in the same
tier of importance as irrigation and domestic uses. Id. In addition, the CVPIA has added restoration and
mitigation of fish and wildlife as additional project goals, albeit at a lower tier of importance. Id The CVPIA
also seeks to double anadromous fish runs by 2002 and dedicates 800,000 acre feet per year for fish and wildlife
purposes. Id. §§ 3406(g), 3406(b), 106 Stats. 4725, 4715. See generally Dunning, supra note 107, at 960-63
(discussing the CVPIA).
In addition, those who deal with these projects may be on greater notice of possible regulatory changes
to water allocation and use than purely private projects. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d
1397, 1405.06 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the CVP contract renewal provisions requiring review under National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) interfered with no vested rights); Peterson v. United States, 899 F.2d 799,
810-11 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Reclamation Reform Act "hammer clause," forcing contract amendments,
interfered with no vested rights to subsidized water for leased land), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990);
Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1990) (overruling similar challenge
to portions of Reclamation Reform Act limiting water deliveries to "excess lands"), cert. denied sub nom; Boston
Ranch Co. v. Department of Interior, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); cf. Federal Court Decides Reclamation Cases, 2 CAL.
WATER L. & POV'Y Rpm. 6 (Oct. 1991) (discussing Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, No. CIV S-91-242
LKK (E.D. Cal., June 14, 1991)); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Duvall, No. CIV S-88-375 LKK (E.D.
Cal., July 26, 1991) (concluding that Reclamation Reform Act regulations required review under NEPA).
Of course, political control over a large water project does not necessarily equate with operational criteria
that elevate environmental or instream values. The environmental impact depends upon how that control is
exercised.
109. See infra notes 111-123 and accompanying text (discussing "public interest" criteria in water
appropriations).
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Legislature has adopted similar criteria for the State Water Board's
consideration of water transfers." 0
Eight Water Code sections direct the State Water Board to consider a
range of public interest criteria when reviewing an application for a permit
to appropriate water."' Section 1255 broadly states the Board's duty to
"reject an application when in its judgment the proposed application would
not best conserve the public interest."'" 2 Similarly, section 1253 requires
the Board to condition an appropriative right to "best develop, conserve,
and utilize in the public interest the water sought to be appropriated.
' 3
Both of these sections date back to the first quarter of this century, when,
as described above, the "public interest" was largely synonymous with
water development." 4 For thirty years after the Legislature granted the
Board this authority, the Board believed it lacked power to reject
applications to appropriate water on general public interest grounds if
unappropriated water existed.1'5 With the passage of supplemental
legislation beginning in the 1950's, the Legislature clarified the Board's
110. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text (discussing "public interest" criteria in water
transfers).
111. CAl. WATER CODE §§ 1242.5, 1243, 1243.5, 1253, 1255, 1257, 1257.5, 1258 (West 1971 & Supp.
1994). See generally SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note 44, at 30-38 (discussing these statutes); Douglas
L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public
Values, 19 ARmZ. ST. L. 683 (1987) (discussing similar statutes in other western states). In addition to these
statutes, § 1228.3(a)(7) requires applicants for "small domestic use" appropriations to obtain Department of Fish
& Game approval of their proposed diversions. CAL. WATER CODE § 1228.3(a)(7) (West Supp. 1994). The
legislature defined a "small domestic use" as a domestic use, as further defined by Board rule, and involving
less than 4500 gallons per day of direct diversion or 10 acre feet per year of diversion by storage. Id. § 1228.1.
In addition, § 1425(b) authorizes the State Water Board to issue temporary permits to meet urgent water needs
if the diversion will not harm fish, wildlife, or other beneficial instream uses. Id. § 1425(b).
112. CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 (West 1971).
113. Id § 1253 (West 1971).
114. 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, sec. 15, at 1021 (enacting original Water Commission Act); id. (authorizing
appropriations); 1917 Cal. Stats. ch. 133, sec. 1, at 194 (amending 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, see, 15, at 1021);
id (adding "beneficial purposes" criteria to State Water Commission review of applications to appropriate); 1921
Cal. Stats. ch. 329, sec. 1, at 443 (amending 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, sec. 15, at 1021, as amended); id. (adding
"best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest" criteria to State Water Commission review of
applications to appropriate); see supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text (discussing how elements of common
law legal doctrine encouraged water development).
115. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 428 & n.7, 658 P.2d 709, 714 & n.7,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 351 & n.7 (1983); see supra note 28 (discussing how predecessors to the State Water Board
perceived the limited role that "public interest" played in appropriations decisions).
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power.1 1 6 Today, the Board's discretion to determine "the public interest"
is virtually unlimited." 7
The "public interest" provides a general vehicle for consideration of
public uses of water and environmental considerations." 8 Six additional
Water Code provisions describe specific constituents of the "public
interest." Section 1243 expressly defines "beneficial uses" to include
recreation, as well as fish and wildlife preservation and enhancement. 9
Section 1243 further directs the Board to "take into account, whenever it
is in the public interest, the amounts of water required for" these beneficial
uses.120 Section 1257 directs the Board to consider the relative benefits
of all beneficial uses, including recreation, fish and wildlife protection and
enhancement. 2 1 Sections 1243.5 and 1257.5 allow the Board to consider
the amount of water necessary to remain within a stream for protection of
116. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363; see infra notes
119-123 and accompanying text (describing the specific legislation enacted to clarify "public interest" criteria).
117. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal. App.
3d 198, 204-07, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770, 773-75 (1974) (stating that State Water Board's determination of "public
interest" will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence); cf. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Bd. (Delta Water Cases), 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 188 (1986) (stating that the
accommodation of "major public interests" in balancing water rights and water quality matters is "essentially
a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified
to make in view of its special knowledge and expertise and its combined statewide responsibility to allocate the
rights to, and to control the quality of, state water resources").
Schneider noted that a dispute remained over the State Water Board's authority to reject a permit entirely.
SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note 44, at 38 (noting an unpublished trial court case that required the State
Water Board to issue a conditional permit rather than reject an application out of hand). Given the continued
expansion of the State Water Board's authority through decisions such as the Delta Water Cases, supra, it seems
unlikely that a court today would either overturn a State Water Board determination of the public interest, or
qualify a Board decision to deny outright on public interest grounds an application to appropriate water.
118. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 980 (noting principal public uses of water considered under
"public interest" criteria include fishing, wildlife sustenance, and recreation).
119. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1994); cf CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 23, § 668 (1994) (defining
"recreational use"); id. § 666 (defining "fish and wildlife preservation and enhancement use").
120. CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1994). Nothing within section 1243 describes how the State
Water Board "takes into account" the listed values. In particular, the statute appears to leave solely for the
Board's discretion the weight to give to the instream uses. Moreover, the statute's ambiguous punctuation
suggests that the State Water Board need not even take those instream uses "into account" if it is not in the
public interest to do so.
121. Id. § 1257 (West 1971). Again, as with § 1243, nothing in § 1257 defines how the State Water Board
is to "consider" all the relative benefits. Must it weight them equally? Must the State Water Board use some
quantified cost/benefit analysis? May it just mention them in passing, to show that it has not ignored them
entirely?
Regulations promulgated in furtherance of § 1250.5, while not addressing the relative weights of values,
do demonstrate the range of information that the State Water Board wishes to have in order to "consider" the
possible instream uses of the water sought to be appropriated. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 23, § 709 (1993).
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beneficial uses.122 Finally, sections 1242.5 and 1258 direct the Board to
consider water quality plans in the appropriation process, and to allow
appropriation by storage for later release for water quality protection or
enhancement.1 23
In matters involving water transfers or changes in uses, the Legislature
has also required consideration of impacts on fish, wildlife, and instream
values. 24 Section 1707 allows any water rights holder to change a water
use in order to preserve or enhance "wetlands habitat, fish and wildlife
resources, or recreation in, or on, the water."'"5 In effect, this statute
authorizes a water user to dedicate water for such purposes, "whether or
not the proposed use involves a diversion of water."'126 Specific statutes
expressly require such consideration for "temporary urgency changes,"'
127
"temporary changes,"'128 and "long term transfers.' 29
122. CAL WATER CODE §§ 1243.5, 1257.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994). Section 1243.5 requires a "public
interest" finding. I. § 1243.5.
Schneider noted the Department of Fish and Game's (DFG) three criticisms of the applicant-by-applicant
approach to instream flow reservations. SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note 44, at 44. These included: 1) The
water project's momentum prior to DFG's involvement cast DFG as a spoiler; 2) the application of the
streamflows to the Central Valley Pioject was uncertain; and 3) water bypassed by one project was subject to
appropriation downstream, requiring DFG to fight its battle all over again. lia The passage of the CVPIA has
likely ameliorated any lingering doubts about DFG's second concern. The other two concerns have been slightly
tempered by the passage of Public Resources Code § 10002, which authorizes the Department to set minimum
stream flows. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 10002 (West Supp. 1994).
123. CAL WATER CODE §§ 1242.5, 1258 (West 1971). Section 1242.5 also requires a "public interest"
finding. Id. § 1242.5; cf. CAL CODE REGS., tit. 23, § 670 (1993) (defining "water quality use").
124. CAL WATER CODE § 1435(b) (West Supp. 1994) (addressing temporary urgency changes); id. §§
1725, 1727 (addressing temporary changes); id § 1735 (addressing long term transfers). For general discussions
of water transfers or changes in California, see Brian E. Gray, A Primer on California Water Transfer Law, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 745 (1989) [hereinafter, Gray, Water Transfer Primer] and Kevin M. O'Brien, Water Marketing
in California, 19 PAC. LJ. 1165 (1988).
125. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 1994). The statute specifically includes holders of "riparian,
or other right[s]," within its scope. Id. The rights holder may make its change under either the general change
provisions, the urgency change provisions, the temporary change provisions, or the long term transfers. Id.
126. Id § 1707(b) (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing use for such purposes, even if it involves a diversion,
only under specified conditions).
127. Id. § 1435(a) (West Supp. 1994) (describing "temporary urgency changes" as those involving "an
urgent need to change a point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use from that specified in [a] permit or
license"). The statute vests broad discretion'with the State Water Board to determine if the change will fulfill
the 1928 amendment's mandate. Id § 1435(c) (West Supp. 1994). Section 1435(b)(3) requires the Board to find
that the "proposed change may be made without unreasonable effect upon fish, wildlife, or other instream
beneficial uses." Id § 1435(b)(3) (West Supp. 1994). Section 1435(b)(4) further requires the Board to find that
the proposed change "is in the public interest" and requires additional findings to support any conditions
imposed to meet fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial use concerns. Id. § 1435(b)(4) (West Supp. 1994).
128. Id. § 1728 (West Supp. 1994) (describing "temporary changes" of points of diversion or use, or
purpose of use, as involving a transfer or exchange of one year or less). Section 1725 authorizes such changes
if "it would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses." Id. § 1725. Section 1727
requires the Board to make express findings to support its conclusion of no unreasonable affect. Id. § 1727(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1994). In addition, § 1725 requires the Board to make specific findings that no "legal water user"
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In addition to these specific sections, two other provisions provide a
general framework for changes in purpose or place of use, or place of
diversion. Section 1702 and companion provisions address changes of
rights acquired after the 1914 effective date of the Water Commission
Act.13" That section authorizes the State Water Board to approve such
changes if it finds "that the change will not operate to the injury of any
legal user of the water involved." '31 Section 1706 applies to pre-1914
appropriations. 132 Section 1706, which does not expressly require State
Water Board approval, authorizes a change if "others are not injured by
such changes."' 33 At the very least, these two provisions would seem to
protect another water rights holder from any impairment of water quality
as a result of a change.' 34 It remains uncertain, however, whether these
two provisions also protect public water uses, if such uses might be
harmed or injured by a proposed change. 35
would suffer any impairment of water quality as a result of the temporary change. fit § 1725(a)(1) (West Supp.
1994).
129. See id. § 1735 (West Supp. 1993) (describing "long term transfers" as involving changes intended
to endure longer than a year). Section 1736 requires the Board to notify the Department of Fish and Game prior
to approving a long term transfer. Id. § 1736 (West Supp. 1993). Section 1736 also requires the Board to
determine that the transfer would not "unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses." Id.
130. Id. §§ 1700-1705.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993).
131. Id § 1702 (West 1971).
132. IUt § 1706 (West 1971).
133. iUt
134. The right to receive water of reasonable quality is part of both the appropriative and riparian rights.
See supra note 30 (discussing the right of both appropriative and riparian rights holders to receive water of
reasonable quality); cf. CAL. WATER CODE § 1727(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that temporary changes may
not impair another legal water user's water quality).
135. On the one hand, a member of the public, appropriately licensed by the Department of Fish and
Game, who has access to a fishery is arguably a "legal user" of that fishery. As such, arguably that fisher should
have standing under § 1702 to claim injury if the fishery is adversely affected by the change in a post-1914
appropriation. CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971). At least as a matter of semantics, such standing would
seem even easier to establish under § 1706 for changes in pre-1914 rights. Section 1706 does not require a
finding of impairment to a "legal user" of water, it simply states that the change may not affect "others." CAL.
WATER CODE § 1706 (West 1971).
On the other hand, in historical context, both sections arguably limit standing to water rights holders. These
sections codify the common law restrictions on water use changes. See HtrrcHiNs, supra note 15, at 175-178
(discussing common law restrictions). All of the common law cases involve water rights holders. See id
(discussing cases involving water rights holders); cf. Gray, Water Transfer Primer, supra note 124, at 767-768
(stating that changes of use are permissible if no harm to other water rights holders). Moreover, more recently
enacted provisions contrast "legal users of water" with public water uses. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725,
1727(a)(1), 1727(a)(2), 1736 (West Supp. 1994).
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IH. EXTERNALLY IMPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the environmental considerations inherent in the water
allocation system itself, numerous other federal and state environmental
statutes impact the allocation and use of private rights to divert and use
water in California. 3 6 These statutes represent exercises of the police
power to accomplish broad goals other than the allocation of water rights.
Nevertheless, in recent years water allocation issues have increasingly been
determined by these external environmental regulations.,37
A. State Fish Protection Statutes: Fish and Game Code and Penal
Code Provisions
Given the Water Code's repeated direction to consider fish and wildlife
values in the water allocation process,'38 and the partial integration of the
Department of Fish and Game into the water allocation process,' 39 it is
136. One additional element of the water allocation system itself potentially implicates environmental
considerations. The reserved rights doctrine holds that the United States, in withdrawing or reserving land from
occupation under the various public lands statutes, also reserved from appropriation enough water to accomplish
the primary purposes of the reservation. E.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698-700 (1978). In
that case, the United States Supreme Court rejected the National Forest Service's attempt to reserve sufficient
water for wildlife purposes. Id. at 705-15. The Court concluded that the National Forest at issue had been
reserved primarily for timber production and watershed protection. Id. at 706-09.
Since New Mexico, the Forest Service has attempted in Colorado to claim that the "watershed protection"
purpose was sufficient to withdraw from appropriation large flows seasonally necessary to flush out the
streambed. See United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 504 (Colo. 1987) (granting the United States the
opportunity to make its case before the Colorado water court). On remand, the trial court ultimately rejected the
claims of the United States. In re Application of the United States, Colorado Dist. Ct. No. 2-8439-76,
Memorandum of Decision & Order, slip op. at 20 (Feb. 12, 1993) (holding that channel maintenance should be
achieved through intelligent administrative regulation, and not reserved water rights).
To date, this author is unaware of any attempt by the United States in California to assert reserved rights
for instream flows in the National Forests in California. Cf. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Systems, which
arose out of a stream adjudication, where the United States successfully established its right to riparian rights
on its National Forest lands. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 44 Cal. 3d 448, 470, 749 P.2d 324, 336,
243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 900 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). At the administrative level in Hallett Creek,
the United States sought to establish a riparian right'to use water for "wildlife enhancement." Id. at 455, 749
P.2d at 326, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 889. The case does not discuss the kinds of "wildlife enhancement" uses for which
the United States intended to use its riparian rights.
137. The two 'most prominent examples have been the impact of the Endangered Species Act, infra notes
196-216 and accompanying text, and the Clean Water Act, infra notes 217-309 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text (describing the Water Code's inclusion of fish and
wildlife in the appropriation context).
139. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 (j) (,Vest 1971) (requiring a water right applicant to furnish the State
Water Board with information provided by the Department of Fish and Game (DFG) regarding proposed
diversion's impact, if any, on fish); cf id. § 6500 (West 1971) (requiring an applicant who seeks permission to
build or enlarge certain dams to submit copies of its application to the DFG); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§
1600-1607 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (requiring the proponents of new water diversions with substantial impact
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somewhat arbitrary to discuss the state fish protection statutes as "external"
to the water allocation process. Indeed, the argument has been made that
many of the state's fish protection statutes did represent a legislative
determination to reserve sufficient water for fish."4 Their position here
as an "external" environmental consideration is arguably as much a result
of history and bureaucratic division of labor as of coherent policy
formulation.14 Because of both their close connection to the water
allocation system, and their current prominence in water allocation
disputes, 4 1 this Article will describe them, and their Penal Code
cousins, 43 as the first of the external environmental considerations.
The state fish protection statutes fall into three groups: 1) Fish passage,
flow bypass, and fish screen provisions;1" 2) streambed alteration
agreements;14 and 3) nuisance statutes." The Fish and Game Code
on a fishery to reach agreement with the DFG over project modifications or mitigation).
140. E.g., California Trout, Inc. v. California State Water Resources Control Bd. (Cal. Trout 1), 207 Cal.
App. 3d 585, 621-25, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 206-08 (1989).
141. Many of the current Fish and Game Code water project operation provisions were originally part of
the Penal Code, enforced by the criminal law. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5935, historical note (West
1984) (tracing statute's origin to former California Penal Code § 637). The Fish and Game provisions developed
along a separate track from the water appropriation statutes. The Legislature enacted the Water Commission Act
in 1913. 1913 Cal. Stats. ch. 586, secs. 1-46, at 1012. Constitutional authorization for fish and game management
by district was enacted in 1902. See former CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 25%, now art. IV, § 20. Statutes
implementing the 1902 amendment, as well as pre-1902 legislation, were first codified together in 1933 - a
decade before the Water Code was enacted. 1933 Cal. Stats. ch. 73, at 394 (enacting California Fish and Game
Code); 1943 Cal. Stats. ch. 368, at 1604 (enacting the California Water Code).
Because the Legislature has historically separated the water allocation statutes and administrative agency
from the fish protection statutes and administrative agency, this Article will observe the same distinction. The
Fish and Game Code provisions play a major role in the operation of water projects otherwise allowed to divert
water under the State Water Board's mandate. See, e.g., Janet K. Goldsmith, Crimes and Misdemeanors: Good
Cinema, Bad Water Policy, 1 CAL. WATER L. & POV'Y RPrT. 47 (Dec. 1990); Harold M. Thomas, Fish, Lies
and Videotape: The Morality of Fisheries Protection, 1 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RpR. 69 (Jan. 1991).
Nevertheless, under the Water Code, the state board is only required to consider impacts on fish and wildlife
as one of a multitude of water uses. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1240 (allowing appropriation for "some useful
or beneficial purpose"); id. § 1243.5 (requiring the State Water Board, when "determining the amount of water
available for appropriation" to consider instream beneficial uses). As such, any additional restrictions on the
operations of a project otherwise approved by the State Water Board is best viewed, in the context of this article,
as an externally imposed environmental constraint on the water allocation process.
142. See Goldsmith, supra note 141, at 47; Thomas, supra note 141, at 69-71.
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 370-374 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining criminal nuisance).
144. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5901, 5931, 5937, 5946, 5948, 5980-5993, 6020-6028, 6100 (West
1984).
145. Id. §§ 1600-1607 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
146. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 370-374 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining criminal nuisance); CAL.
FISH & GAME CODE § 5650(0 (West 1984) (prohibiting the release of substances harmful to fish, plant, or bird
life); CAL. Cmivi. CODE §§ 3479-3480 (West 1970) (defining civil nuisance).
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devotes five articles to dams, obstructions, conduits, and screens. 47 Two
statutes directly address fish passage barriers. Section 5901, applicable in
ten of the state's fish and game districts, bars, "except as otherwise
provided in this code," the construction or maintenance of "any device or
contrivance which prevents, impedes, or tends to prevent or impede, the
passing of fish up and down stream."'148 The "exceptions" appear to
require either the construction of a fishway,149 a fish hatchery, 5 ' or a
147. CAL- FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5900-6100 (West 1984) (containing Articles 1 through 5 of Fish and
Game Code division 6, part 1, chapter 3). Section 5900(a) broadly defines "dam" for purposes of chapter 3 as
"all artificial obstructions:' Id. § 5900(a) (West 1984).
148. Id. § 5901 (West 1984). The 10 districts are Districts 1, 1 , 2, 2 , 2 , 3, 4, 4 , 23 & 25. Id. By
implication, the statute is not applicable in the 27 other districts established by the Fish and Game Code. See
id. §§ 11001-11039 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (defining 37 fish and game districts within California),
149. Id. § 5931 (West 1984). The state Fish and Game Commission determines if "there is not free passage
for fish over or around any dam." Id.; see id. § 101 (West 1984) (recognizing the creation of the Fish and Game
Commission by Section 20, art. IV of the California Constitution). Upon such a finding, the Commission directs
the Department of Fish and Game (DFG) to prepare plans for a fishway. Id. § 5931 (Vest 1984). If the
Commission orders a fishway, the dam operator must complete it to DFG's satisfaction within a specified time.
Id.
One of the open questions about the fishway process involves the circumstances giving a dam operator
"closure," i.e., assurances that they have complied with the law and are not liable for additional, potentially
expensive construction. Section 5930 requires the DFG to "examine all dams in all rivers and streams in this
State naturally frequented by fish." Id. § 5930 (West 1984). The department must make its examinations "from
time to time:' Id. This statute probably imposes a continuing duty upon the DFG to inspect, and reinspect, dams
within the state. Alternatively, it could simply be an open ended mandate to survey the state's stream system
once, whenever DFG had available resources. Such a narrow reading makes little sense, particularly given the
acknowledgement in § 5932 of changed conditions. See id. § 5932 (West 1984) (allowing DFG to respond to
changed conditions). As a result of such a survey, the DFG can go to the Commission for a finding of impaired
fish passage and an order to construct a fishway. Id. § 5931 (West 1984). Section 5932 states that if the dam
operator has complied with "all of the provisions of this article:' and changed conditions require additional
structures for fish passage, then DFG may build such structures and expend the necessary funds. Id. § 5932
(West 1984). Assuming the dam operator has built the initially ordered fishway to DFG's satisfaction, and keeps
the fishway "in repair and open and free from obstructions to the passage of fish at all times." See id. § 5935
(West 1984) (requiring dam operator to keep fishway repaired). It appears that DFG has the duty to make, and
pay for, further additional structures required by "changed conditions." The meaning of "changed conditions"
is unclear. In particular, does it include lack of adequate knowledge about a project's impact on a fishery? In
addition, the statutory scheme leaves unaddressed the duty of a project owner, if any, to pay for further
construction in the event that the fishway ordered by DFG does not work. Is "dysfunctionality" a "changed
condition"? Cf. id. § 5989 (West 1984) (stating that if a fish screen is dysfunctional as designed, then a project
owner "shall not be required to install a new screen."). Issues involving these statutes have arisen in a
longstanding dispute over the County of Sonoma's operation of a summer recreational dam on the Russian River
at Healdsburg. See United Anglers v. County of Sonoma, Super. Ct. No. 340184 (Sacramento County), appeal
pending, No. 3 Civ. 3802 (3d Dist., Cal. Ct. App.).
150. CA. FISH & GAME CODE § 5938 (West 1984) (authorizing the commission to order a dam owner
to build a fish hatchery in lieu of a fishway if the commission deems a fishway impracticable). Section 5942
authorizes fish plants in lieu of either a fishway or a hatchery. Id. § 5942 (Vest 1984).
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fish screen. 1' Section 5948 bars fish passage obstruction by log jams,
debris accumulation or other artificial barriers, other than lawful dams,
bridge abutments, and other permitted structures.
5 2
In addition to these fish passage barrier statutes, the Fish and Game
Code contains a general flow bypass provision. Section 5937 requires the
owner of any dam to "allow sufficient water . . . to pass through a
fishway, or [absent] a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around
or through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted
or exist below the dam."'13 This statute has been the subject of several
recent lawsuits, including litigation over the operation of the federal
Central Valley Project's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River 54 In the
151. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5980-5993, 6020-6028 (West 1984). Sections 5980-5993 address
"conduits," defined in section 5900(b), either used for hydropower generation, or having flow capacities greater
than 250 cubic feet per second (cfs). Id. § 5980 (West 1984). Section 5900(b) defines a "conduit" as "pipe,
millrace, ditch, flume, siphon, tunnel, canal, and any other conduit or diversion used for the purpose of taking
or receiving water from any river, creek, stream or lake." Id. § 5900(b) (West 1984). Sections 5981-5987 set
up a cost sharing system whereby, nonhydropower conduit owners and DFG split screening costs equally. Id.
§§ 5981-5987 (West 1984). Sections 6020-6028 apply to all other conduits. See id. § 6020 (West 1984). In
addition to screening these smaller diversions, section 6021 authorizes the imposition of flow bypasses to "carry
fish stopped by the screen ... back to the channel from which they were diverted...... Id. § 6021 (West 1984).
Section 6022 then sets forth maximum required bypass rates. Id. § 6022 (West 1984).
The fish screen requirements, and liability for fish screen failure, have been central issues in the ongoing
litigation between Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (GCID) and DFG over GCID's Sacramento River diversions.
See United States v. Glenn Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that fish
killed by screen were "taken" under the Endangered Species Act).
Section 6100 adds additional screening requirements for post-1971 new water diversions that may be
"deleterious to salmon and steelhead." CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 6100 (West 1984). Where applicable, this
section supersedes sections 5980-5993 and 6020-6028. Id. The statute makes the fish screen mandatory, and
places the screen's entire cost on the water diverter. Id.
152. Id § 5948 (West 1984). Unlike § 5901, § 5948 contains no restriction to specified fish and game
districts. See id § 5901 (West 1984) (restricting statute's operation to enumerated districts); id. § 5948 (West
1984) (lacking any such restriction). Section 5948 also appears to bar the obstruction of fish passage by mining
debris, although it does so a bit ambiguously. See id § 5948 (West 1984) (describing permitted "artificial
barrier" with list of lawful permanent transport and commercial facilities). Section 5948 applies even if fish
passage is not effected if the prohibited items otherwise are "deleterious to fish as determined by the [Fish and
Game] commission ... Id.
153. Id § 5937 (West 1984). Section 5946 makes § 5937 applicable to any appropriative permit or license
issued after September 9, 1953, in District 4Y2. Id. § 5946. The City of Los Angeles' Mono basin diversions fell
within the scope of sections 5946 and 5937. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (Cal.
Trout 1), 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 631-33, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212-13 (1989); see also California Trout, Inc. v.
State Water Resources Control Bd. (Cal. Trout I1), 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 212-13, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788, 803-04
(1990) (holding that the City of Los Angeles had to comply immediately with section 5937). For a general
discussion of section 5937, see SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note 44, at 55-56; Baiocchi, supra note 25,
at 433-460.
154. See National Resources Defense Council v. Pattersen, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1435 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(finding claim stated against United States under § 5937). In that case, United States District Court Judge
Karlton ruled that § 5937 applied to the operation of the Central Valley Project's Friant Dam. Id. §§ 1433-35.
Other lawsuits involving § 5937 have included the Healdsburg Dam litigation, United Anglers v. County of
Sonoma, Super. Ct. No. 340184 (Sacramento County), appeal pending, No. 3 Civ. 3802 (3d Dist., Cal. Ct. App.),
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early 1950's, as Friant Dam was ready for operation, the California
Attorney General opined that section 5937 did not reserve water for fish
if such water was needed for domestic uses or irrigation.' The
California Court of Appeals implicitly rejected this interpretation in Cal.
Trout L 5 6 In a series of recent rulings, a United States District Court
judge has found that section 5937 does indeed apply to the Friant Dam
operations.157 Other recent disputes have involved questions of standing
to raise fish passage issues, 58  the existence of private rights of
and the Putah Creek Water cases. See Private Right of Action Exists Under § 5937 of Fish and Game Code, 4
CAL WATER L. & PoL'Y RPrm. 13 (Oct. 1993) (updating the status of the Putah Creek cases pending in
Sacramento Superior Court).
155. 18 Op. CAL Arr'Y GEN. 31, 36-39 (1951). That opinion explained the state's position in Rank v.
Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950), a lawsuit brought by, inter alia, certain riparians seeking to enjoin the
operation of Friant dam.
156. CaL Trout !, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 621-24, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 206-08 (1989). The case does not
discuss the 1951 Attorney General's opinion. Id.
157. See Natural Resources Defense. Council v. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1435 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding that plaintiffs have standing to raise claim, under the federal Administrative Procedures Act, that Bureau
of Reclamation was not complying with § 5937); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, No. CIV. S-
88-1658 LKK (E.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 1993) (denying the defendants' motion to dismiss). Prior to the passage of
the CVPIA, supra note 108, the Federal Bureau of Reclamation had a better argument that it was not bound,
under § 8 of the Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 383 & 372, to follow § 5937. As interpreted in California v.
United States, § 8 incorporates state water law unless a specific provision of such state law would frustrate the
Congressional purpose in authorizing the specific reclamation project at issue. California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645, 674-75 (1978). The Friant Dam's dewatering of the upper reaches of the San Joaquin River was likely
contemplated by Congress, and an intended consequence of the Central Valley Project. United States v. Gerlach
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 729 (1950). Thus, prior to the CVPIA, even if California law had interpreted §
5937 as reserving water for fish, arguably the Bureau of Reclamation would have been free to ignore it under
the preemptive authority of congressional authorization for the Friant Dam. Even prior to passage of the CVPIA,
however, Judge Karlton rejected this argument. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. at 1433-35. In the CVPIA, however,
Congress specifically mandated the Bureau to comply with all California law in the operations of the CVP. See
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. Law No. 102-575, § 3406(b), 106 STAT. 4714 (1992) (requiring
the CVP "to meet all obligations under State and Federal law ... and all decisions of the [State Water Board]").
This provision of the CVPIA lends strong support to the claim that the CVP must follow § 5937. In addition,
Judge Karlton recently rejected a claim that an additional portion of the CVPIA exempted the Bureau from
complying with § 5937 for the portion of the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam. Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Patterson, No. CIV. S-88-1658 LKK, slip op. at 25-46 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 1993) (denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss and finding that the CVPIA § 3406(c) does not "preempt" Section 5937, despite
the federal statute's direction that the Bureau not release water below Friant Dam "to implement [the CVPIA]"
until Congress expressly so directs).
158. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1435 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (ruling
that the plaintiffs have standing to raise claim, under the Federal Administrative Procedures Act, that the Bureau
of Reclamation was not complying with section 5937); cf. Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 808-10 (S.D. Cal.
1950) (holding that riparian owners have no standing to raise fish passage challenges under the California Fish
and Game Code). The Healdsburg Dam litigation also raised standing issues. See United Anglers v. County of
Sonoma, Super. Ct. No. 340184 (Sacramento County), appealpending, No. 3 Civ. 3802 (3d Dist., Cal. Ct. App.).
In the Healdsburg Dam case, defendant county argued that, given section 5937's Penal Code origins, plaintiffs
lacked standing to raise a violation of a penal provision. Il
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action,159 and the dam operator's duty, if any, to release flows from
storage that would have exceeded natural flows."
The second group of fish and wildlife protection statutes that impact
water allocation involves streambed alteration agreements. 6 ' In general,
the proponent of any public or private water project or other activity that
will divert, obstruct, or change a watercourse's "natural flow," channels or
banks, must first notify the Department of Fish and Game (DFG). 162
After receiving notice, the DFG determines "if an existing fish or wildlife
resource will be substantially adversely affected" by the project. 63 If it
finds such impact, the DFG has thirty days to propose modifications. 64
If the parties are unable to agree over the proposed modifications, binding
arbitration ensues.' 65 No project may begin diversion or streambed
alteration until either the proponent and the DFG agree to modifications,
or an arbitrator issues an award.' 66 The statutes expressly exempt routine
maintenance and operations 67 and emergency work. 6  Little reported
litigation has resulted from the streambed alteration scheme. 69
159. See Private Right ofAction Exists Under § 5937 ofFish and Game Code, 4 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y
RPTR. 13, 13 (Oct. 1993) (summarizing the trial court ruling in the Putah Creek Water Cases that a private right
of action exists under California Fish and Game Code § 5937).
160. See Amended Complaint Filed in Putah Creek Adjudication, 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPM. 164,
164-65 (May 1992) (summarizing the release requirement issues raised in the Putah Creek Water Cases by the
Solano Irrigation District's amended complaint).
161. CAL FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1600-1604, 1607 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
162. Id. Section 1601 applies to projects undertaken by governmental bodies or public utilities. Id § 1601
(West Supp. 1993). Section 1603 applies to projects undertaken by all "persons," presumably, not including the
governmental or utilities addressed by § 1601. Id. § 1603 (West 1984). The two schemes are substantially
similar. Both require the project proponent to notify the DFG before diverting water, or altering a watercourse's
channel or bank, if the DFG has designated that watercourse as a fishery. Id. §§ 1601(a), 1603 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1994). Section 1601 requires such notice before the public agency or utility makes any diversion or
alteration; § 1603, however, requires all other persons to notify the DFG only if the diversion or alteration is
"substantial." i. § 1603 (West 1984). Similarly, both require notification if a project proponent plans to use any
material from the streambeds. Id. § 1601(a) (West Supp. 1994). In addition, § 1601 specifically requires public
agencies or utilities to notify the DFG before depositing any "crumbled, flaked or ground pavement where it can
pass into any [designated watercourse]." Id. § 1601(a) (West Supp. 1994).
163. Id. §§ 1601(a), 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
164. Id. §§ 1601, 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
165. Id. §§ 1601(b), 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
166. Id. §§ 1601(c), 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
167. Id. §§ 1601(e), 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994). Section 1601(d) authorizes the DFG to exempt
additional activities by regulation. Id. § 1601(d) (West Supp. 1994). Routine exemptions end if the existing
operations or fish and wildlife conditions substantially change and the fish or wildlife resources are adversely
affected by the project. Id. §§ 1601(e), 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
168. Id. §§ 1601(0, 1603 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994). Project operators must notify DFG within 14 days
of commencing any emergency work. Id. at § 1601(0 (West Supp. 1994).
169. The one reported case is Mega Renewables v. Shasta County, 644 F. Supp. 491,499 (E.D. Cal. 1986)
(holding that federal law does not preempt the application of § 1603 to hydroelectric project).
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The third set of fish and wildlife protection statutes that impacts water
allocation include criminal and civil nuisance provisions. 7 ' Fish and
Game Code section 5650(f) makes it illegal to "deposit in, permit to pass
into, or place where it can pass into the waters of this State ...any
substance or material deleterious to fish, plant life, or bird life.' 171 Penal
Code section 370, the general criminal nuisance statute, defines a "public
nuisance" as "anything which... unlawfully obstructs the free passage or
use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream,
canal, or basin . .. ., Civil Code section 3479 similarly defines
"public nuisance."1 73 These statutes enjoy a long history of use for
environmental protection; as noted above, nuisance actions were the
principal common law remedy either for the public in general or a water
rights holder in particular impacted by releases into a watercourse.' 74
Recently, they have been "rediscovered" and used in criminal prosecutions
of reservoir operators whose releases have been linked to fish kills.
75
B. Environmental Review Statutes: The California Environmental
Quality Act and the National Environmental Policy Act
Two environmental review statutes, one state and one federal, broadly
mandate consideration of environmental impacts before public agencies
approve discretionary "projects.' 76  Unlike the other environmental
170. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 370-74 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining criminal nuisance); CAL. FISH
& GAME CODE § 5650(f) (West 1984) (banning the release of substances harmful to fish, plant, or bird life);
CAL. CvIL CODE § 3479-80 (West 1970) (defining civil nuisance).
171. CAL. FISH & GAmE CODE § 5650(0 (West 1984). Culpability attaches without proof of scienter or
negligence. People v. Chevron Chem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 50,56, 191 Cal. Rptr. 537,541 (1983) (concluding
that § 5650 imposes strict liability).
172. CAL PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1988).
173. CAL. CIVIn CODE §§ 3479-80 (West 1970). Section 3479 defines "nuisance" in terms virtually
identical to Penal Code § 370. Id. § 3479 (West 1970). Section 3480 then adds: "A public nuisance is one which
affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons ...."
Id. § 3480 (West 1970).
174. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the public nuisance doctrine). Indeed, public
nuisance was the vehicle used to end the gold dredging era. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal.
138, 150-52, 4 P. 1152, 1158-60 (1884); see Gray, In Search of Bigfoot, supra note 21, at 24345 (discussing
the Gold Run Ditch case).
175. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 141; Thomas, supra note 141 (presenting the opposing views
on propriety of using criminal prosecutions for harm to fish).
176. The National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA) review and reporting requirements apply to
"proposals for. . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment .... .
42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) (West 1977). This includes the permitting of private conduct. E.g., Colorado River Indian
Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding the Army Corps of Engineers permit
requirement triggered an obligation to review the entire project's impact); see contra Winnebago Tribe v. Ray,
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statutes considered here, these statutes ultimately may require little more
than consideration of a water project's impact on the environment."'
Nevertheless, they provide substantial procedural hurdles to many project
proponents, 78 and important vehicles to focus public attention on water
issues.'79
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires public
agencies to assess, consider, and mitigate where feasible, a proposed
discretionary action's environmental impacts before approving such an
action. 180 CEQA requires the "lead agency"'1 8 to prepare and circulate
621 F.2d 269, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the need for a federal river crossing permit was insufficient
federal action to trigger NEPA review of the entire 67 mile long power line project), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836.
It likely does not, however, apply if the federal agency has no discretion to deny a permit. E.g., South Dakota
v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the ministerial act of the issuance of a
mineral patent triggered no NEPA review requirements), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822. See contra Scenic Rivers
Ass'n. v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 245 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a ministerial act could trigger NEPA
requirements) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776,791-
93 (1976). The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) expressly applies to "projects to be carried out
by public agencies." CAL PUB, REs. CODE § 21001.1 (West 1986). Section 20165 defines "project" to include
actions undertaken, supported, or permitted by public agencies. Id. § 21065. It does not include "ministerial
acts." See CAL. CODE REos. tit. 14, § 15002(i) (1993) (noting the applicability of CEQA to discretionary acts).
177. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4335 (West 1977), merely dictates consideration of a project's environmental
consequences; NEPA does not itself limit a federal agency's discretion to approve a project with known
environmental harms. E.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (holding that NEPA is purely
procedural); see also MICHAEL H. REMY, Er AL, GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALT Acr
(CEQA) 10-11 (5th ed. 1991) (summarizing the case law on NEPA requirements).
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986
& Supp. 1994), has more substance than NEPA. REMY, supra, at 10-15. In many circumstances, CEQA
mandates mitigation of environmental harms where feasible. CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE § 21081(a) (West 1986).
Ultimately, however, CEQA allows the agency responsible for preparing the environmental impact report (EIR)
to make a finding that "[s]pecific economic, social, or other considerations make infeasible the mitigation
measures or project alternatives identified in the [EIR]." Id. § 21081(c).
178. Legions of cases under both NEPA and CEQA have found projects enjoined for improper
environmental review. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1490-92 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (enjoining logging in spotted owl habitat pending NEPA compliance); Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 427-28, 764 P.2d 278, 306-07, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 454-55
(1988) (enjoining the University of California from expanding the School of Pharmacy facility until it had fully
complied with CEQA).
179. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (stating that
NEPA's twin purposes include provision of information to decision maker and dissemination of information to
the public).
180. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). See generally REMY, supra note
177 (summarizing and analyzing the extensive statutory, regulatory, and common law CEQA requirements).
181. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21067 (West 1986) (defining "lead agency" as "the public agency which
has principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a project which may have significant effect upon the
environment").
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for public comment either a "negative declaration"' 8 2  or an
"environmental impact report."'183 Normally, CEQA applies to State
Water Board review of water appropriation and transfer applications.'
State Water Board promulgated water quality control plans are "certified
regulatory programs" not subject to separate environmental review and
documentation under CEQA. t8 5 Implementation of a water quality plan
by a water rights decision, however, may not be exempt from CEQA. 8 6
Beyond the appropriation context, tCEQA also applies to construction
activities on water development projects, whether conducted by the state
Department of Water Resources (DWR), or by other public
agencies. 87
182. See id. § 21064 (West 1986) (defining "negative declaration"); id. § 21080.1 (West Supp, 1994)
(requiring the lead agency to prepare either a negative declaration or an environmental impact report) (West
1986). A "negative declaration" is "a written statement briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project will
not have a significant effect on the environment.... Id. § 21064 (West 1986); see Ri ,Y, supra note 177, at
105-30 (discussing negative declarations).
183. See CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21061 (West 1986) (describing requirements for an environmental impact
report); id. § 21081 (West 1986) (requiring the lead agency to prepare an EIR if necessary). An "environmental
impact report (EIR)" is a "detailed statement" addressing a proposed project's significant environmental effects,
including a half dozen specific criteria included by statute. Id. § 21100. See generally REmY, supra note 177,
at 131-257 (describing the EIR process and contents).
184. Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 980-81. The Legislature has exempted temporary water changes
from CEQA compliance. CAL. WATER CODE § 1729 (West Supp. 1994).
185. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080.5 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing the Secretary of Resources to
exempt "certified regulatory projects" from separate CEQA reporting); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15252 (1993)
(outlining exemption). See generally REMY, supra note 177, at 78-83 (discussing exemption).
186. The applicability of CEQA to the State Water Board's draft D-1630 was disputed. In its proposed
decision, the State Water Board issued an "interim decision" addressing public trust values in the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta estuary (Bay/Delta estuary). D-1630, supra note 82, at 1.4. The decision
establishes certain flow standards for the Bay/Delta estuary. Id. The Board acknowledged that its decision was
one attempt to implement the water quality plan for salinity it had previously adopted. Id. at 6 n.l. Nevertheless,
claiming it was merely "enforcing" the public trust ana reasonableness doctrines, the State Board claimed it was
categorically exempt from CEQA compliance. Id. at 90-92 (citing California Code of Regulations title 14, sees.
15321(a), 15307, 15308, 15301 (1993) which contain categorical exemptions for enforcement of rules,
environmental enhancement, and ongoing operations). The Board further claimed that it was not within the
exemption from the exemption for projects whose unusual circumstances might significantly and adversely affect
the environment. D-1630, supra note 82, at 92-98 (citing California Code of Regulations title 14, sec. 15301.2(c)
(1993)). But cf KEV M. O'BRIEN, State Water Resources Control Board Draft Decision 1630: A Critique, 3
CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y Rvm. 101, 104 (Mar. 1993) (criticizing the State Board and concluding that the
proposed decision was not exempt). As noted previously, the State Water Board ultimately declined to adopt
the decision. See 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 812 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (noting that the State Water
Board acted in response to directions from California Governor Wilson).
187. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 814, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 390 (1973) (subjecting
to CEQA review construction of additional aqueduct for increased groundwater export); cf. Leach v. City of San
Diego, 220 Cal. App. 3d 389, 395, 269 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331-32 (1990) (holding that the drafting of water between
two reservoirs part of ongoing dam operations was exempt from CEQA). For an example of a DWR EIR, see
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER REsouRcEs, DRAFT PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: STATE
DROUGHT WATER BANK (Jan. 1993).
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On the federal side, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
similarly requires federal agencies to conduct an environmental assessment
prior to approving projects.'8 8 NEPA applies to Bureau of Reclamation
water projects, 8 9 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hydropower
permits,' 90 and Army Corps of Engineers wetlands permits.19' NEPA
has been the subject of repeated litigation in California in water rights
matters. 92 Most recently, litigation over Reclamation Reform Act
regulations, 93 and Central Valley Project contract renewals has involved
NEPA compliance. 94 Congress recently mandated preparation of a new
programmatic environmental impact statement to assess the environmental
consequences of the Central Valley Project.1 95
C. Endangered Species Protection
Both state' 96  and federal' 97  laws protecting endangered and
threatened species have recently emerged at the forefront of disputes
188. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4332 (West 1977).
189. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1404-06 (9th Cir.) (holding that the
CVP contract renewals triggered NEPA review), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 59 (1993). Courts have not, however,
required the NEPA review of ongoing operations of reservoirs, absent changes in operating regimes.. See infra
note 192.
190. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1992). See generally 4 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 357-60 & 1993 Supp. 36-38
(R. Beck ed., 1991 ed.) (discussing NEPA review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission projects).
191. See, e.g., Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 992 (9th Cir.
1993) (noting that after NEPA review, the Army Corps imposed 14 conditions on wetlands permit to mitigate
environmental harm).
192. See, e.g., County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding
the designation of 5 North Coast rivers as components of the Wild and Scenic River system upheld despite
trivial noncompliance with NEPA); County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368, 1388-1389 (E.D. Cal.,
1977) (holding that absent changes in operating regime, ongoing dam operations are not subject to NEPA
review); Columbia Canal Co. v. United States, No. CIV S-91-769-WBS/JFM (E.D. Cal., Motion to Dismiss,
Nov. 19, 1991), in 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 69,70 (Jan. 1992) (concluding that NEPA was inapplicable
to an agreement to wheel water from Mendota pool).
193. See Federal Court Decides Reclamation Cases, 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'V Rpm. 6,6-9 (Oct. 1991)
(discussing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Duvall, No. CIV S-88-375 LKK (E.D. Cal., July 26, 1991)
(holding that Reclamation Reform Act regulations required review under NEPA)).
194. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the CVP
contract renewal provisions requiring review under NEPA interfered with no vested rights); Natural Res. Defense
Council v. Patterson, No. CIV S-88-1658 LKK, 9-11 (E.D. Cal., 1993) (holding that NEPA challenges to the
validity of pre-CVPIA contract renewals were not rendered moot by passage of CVPIA).
195. Cental Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. Law No. 102-575, § 3409, 106 STAT. 4716 (1992).
196. CAL. FISH & GAmE CODE §§ 2050-98 (West Supp. 1994).
197. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
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involving major California water diverters.'98 Collectively, the California
Endangered Species Act (CESA) and the federal Endangered Species Act
(ESA) have led to actual or threatened changes of diversions and reservoir
operations in the Sacramento River and Delta in order to protect the
dwindling stocks of Sacramento River winter-ran chinook salmon'99 and
delta smelt.2' Additional listings may further restrict water operations
in California.20 '
198. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1135-36 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(holding the that federal Endangered Species Act supported an injunction against an irrigation district's
diversions); Department of Fish and Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1554, 1568-
69, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230-31 (1992) (holding that the California Endangered Species Act supported an
injunction against the irrigation district's diversions); see also Laura B. King, Query: The Endangered Species
Act-Is it Fish versus People? Response: No. Don't Shoot the Messenger, 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'y RPTR.
151, 151-53 (May 1992) [hereinafter King, The Endangered Species Act] (arguing in support of the federal act);
Stuart L. Somach, The Endangered Species Act: How Great is the Threat?, 2 CAL. WATER L. & PoL'y RPTR.
153, 154-55 (May 1992) [hereinafter Somach, Endangered Species Act] (arguing that the act has major flaws).
See generally Melissa K. Estes, Comment, The Effect of the Federal Endangered Species Act on State Water
Rights, 22 ENVTL. L. 1027 (1992) (concluding that those who hold state water rights may have to yield to the
Endangered Species Act in order to protect the Snake River sockeye and chinook salmon's habitat).
199. The state Fish and Game Commission listed the Sacramento River winter-run chinook salmon (winter
run salmon) as an endangered species under the state act in 1989. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 670.5(a)(2)(M)
(1993). The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed the winter run salmon as a threatened
species under the federal act in 1990.55 FED. REG. 49623-01 (1990). The USFWS later changed the designation
to endangered. See 59 FED. REG. 440-01 (1994). Both of these listing decisions have led to injunctions against
large Sacramento River diverters. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1135-36
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (finding a similar result under the Federal Endangered Species Act); Department ofFish and
Game, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1568-69, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 230-31 (holding that the Sacramento River winter run
chinook salmon are protected by the state act). In addition to the restrictions placed by the courts in the two cited
cases, the State Water Board ordered operational changes in the Central Valley Project to provide more favorable
temperature conditions for salmon. SWRCB, Order No. 90-5 (1990) (concluding that public trust, waste
prevention and water quality enforcement powers supported operational changes to protect salmon); see Lawsuits
Challenge Water Board Amendments to Lake Shasta Water Right Permits, 1 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y Rprm.
14, 14 (Oct. 1990) (discussing the legal challenges to Order No. 90-5).
200. Prodded in part by a lawsuit, the USFWS listed the Delta Smelt as a threatened species in 1993. 58
FED. REG. 12854 (1993); see Environmental Organizations Sue to Force Listing of Delta Smelt, 3 CAL. WATER
L. & PoL'Y RPTt. 115, 115 (Mar. 1993) (discussing the suit against the USFWS). The combined effect of this
listing and the winter run salmon on water diversions is still developing. Early in 1993, prior to the substantial
precipitation, the state Department of Water Resources had estimated that as much as I million acre-feet of water
might be lost to the state and federal water projects in order to protect winter run salmon and delta smelt. See
Wet Year, Lower Demands Combine to Reduce Impacts of Fish Protection Measures on SWP and CVP Water
Supplies, 4 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RFrR. 10, 10 (Oct. 1993).
201. See, e.g., United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice of ]-Year Finding on a Petition to List to
Longfin Smelt, 59 FED. REG. 869 (1994) (proposing not to list longfin smelt at this time); United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Proposed Determination of Threatened Status for the Sacramento Splittail, 59 FED. REG. 862
(1994) (proposing to list fish native to Bay/Delta estuary); United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
Determination of Threatened Status for the Giant Garter Snake, 58 FED. REG. 54053-01 (1993) (listing the
Sacramento Valley snake as threatened); see also Settlement Reached on ESA Suit: 400 Species to be Listed, 3
CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPm. 113, 113 (Mar. 1993) (noting that 6 California species, including Mono Lake
brine shrimp, may be listed); Species Protection Actions: Applications to List Delta Fish and a Court Order
Requiring USFWS to Designate the Colorado River as Critical Habitat, 3 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y Rrm. 93,
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The structure of the two acts is very similar. Both define "endangered,"
"threatened," and "species" similarly.20 2 Both involve a listing process
which may be initiated by public petition.20 3  Both prohibit their
respective coordinate agencies from undertaking any project which might
"jeopardize" a listed species.204 Finally, both broadly prohibit any person
93-94 (Feb. 1993) (stating that the Sacramento splittail, longfin smelt, spring run salmon and green sturgeon,
all present in Delta, face "imminent" listings under the ESA).
202. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West 1985); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2062 (West Supp. 1994). The CESA
defines an "endangered species" as a "native species or subspecies of bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile,
or plant which is in serious danger of becoming extinct throughout all, or a significant portion, of its range due
to one or more causes, including loss of habitat, change in habitat, overexploitation, predation, competition, or
disease." CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 2062 (West Supp. 1994). The ESA defines an "endangered species" as
"any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than
[certain insect pests]." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West 1985). The ESA further defines "species" to include "any
subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any vertebrate species or wildlife
which interbreeds when mature." Id. § 1532(16) (West 1985).
Three principal differences between the two definitions exist. First, the CESA applies only to "native
species;" the ESA contains no such express limitation. Thus, the CESA would likely not protect the Striped Bass,
as that fish is not native to California. Second, the CESA qualifies "danger of extinction" with "serious," again,
the ESA imposes no such qualification. Finally, while both definitions include "subspecies," the ESA "species"
definition also includes "distinct population segment" of interbreeding vertebrates. The applicability of the ESA
to subspecies has been the subject of some controversy recently. See generally Kevin W. Grierson, Note, The
Concept of Species and the Endangered Species Act, 11 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 463 (1992) (discussing the problems
of hybrids). In all three instances, at least on its surface, the ESA definitions sweep slightly more broadly than
the CESA.
The two acts also define "threatened" species similarly. The CESA defines a "threatened species" as one
that "is likely to become an endangered species in the foreseeable future in the absence of the special protection
and management efforts required by [the CESA]." CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2067 (West Supp. 1994). The
ESA defines "threatened species" as one "which is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future .... 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(20) (West 1985). Under the CESA, little practical difference ensues
from the designation as "threatened" as opposed to "endangered." The CESA's "taking" provisions apply equally
to endangered and threatened species. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2080 (West Supp. 1994). Under the ESA,
the "taking" proscriptions expressly apply only to "endangered species." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1985).
Nevertheless, the ESA gives the United States Fish and Wildlife Service the authority, at the time of listing, to
extend by regulation the taking proscriptions to threatened species. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1533(D), 1538(A)(1)(G) (West
1985).
203. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (establishing ESA listing process); CAL FISH &
GaME CODE §§ 2070-2079 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing CESA listing process). Under both acts, the listing
agencies must base their decisions on "the best scientific information available." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(1)(A)
(West 1985). CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2074.6 (West Supp. 1993). If the appropriate agency finds that the
proposed species meets the definition of "endangered" or "threatened," it adds that species to a formally
promulgated "list" of similar species 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(2) (West 1985). CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2070
(West Supp. 1994); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 670.5 (1993) (listing "endangered species" under CESA).
Under the ESA, after listing a new species, the USFWS must also designate "critical habitat" for the newly
listed species. Unlike the initial species designation determination, the critical habitat designation may include
a comparison of the costs and benefits of such habitat designation, unless a cost based habitat exclusion would
result in the species' extinction. Id.
204. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2090-2097 (West Supp.
1994). Each act sets up an interagency consultation scheme under which the listing agency recommends any
mitigation measures necessary to prevent "jeopardy" to a species. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2091 (West Supp.
1994); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (West 1985).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
from "taking" a listed species. 5 Criminal sanctions exist for violations
of the respective acts.206
Despite the structural similarities between the two provisions, the ESA
likely provides the stronger theoretical protection to listed species. The
criminal fines available under the ESA may reach $50,000 for each
violation.0 7 In contrast, criminal fines for CESA violations have a
$5,000 ceiling per violation.20 8 Moreover, the state legislature added a
"feasibility" qualification to the CESA's "anti-jeopardy" provision.2 9
This qualification allows a state agency to approve a project which might
jeopardize a listed species if that agency both requires "reasonable"
mitigation measures to "minimize" the project's impact, and finds that the
project's benefits outweigh its impacts.210 In contrast, the ESA contains
only the cumbersome and rarely used "God Committee" exemption process
to exempt a species from the ESA "anti-jeopardy" provisions."21
The two acts' potential impact on water appropriations and diversions
is substantial. Nothing in either act acknowledges expressly any exemption
205. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1538(A)(1)(B) (West 1985); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2080 (West Supp. 1994). The
ESA expressly defines "take" broadly to include: "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19) (West 1985). Although the
CESA contains no such express definition, the agency in charge of CESA implementation has broadly applied
"take." For example, the California Court of Appeal upheld the California Department of Fish and Game's
construction of "take [or] possess" to include non-hunting or fishing activities, such as entrainment of fish in
diversion pumps. Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1554,
1558, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 224 (1992). The USFWS has also broadly applied the ESA "take" definition. See,
e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
maintenance of nonprotected competitor species in protected species' critical habitat area was "take" under the
USFWS regulations defining "harm" and "harassment").
206. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12008 (West Supp.
1994).
207. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(B)(1) (West Supp. 1993). In addition, civil penalties may reach $25,000 per
violation. Id § 1540(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
208. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 12008 (West Supp. 1994).
209. Id § 2092 (West Supp. 1994). Section 2063 defines "feasible" by reference to CEQA's definition.
Id § 2063 (West Supp. 1994) (citing California Public Resources Code sec. 21061.1 (West 1986)). CEQA
defines "feasible" as: "capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,
taking into account economic, environmental, social, and technological factors." CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21061.1
(West 1986).
210. CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 2092(b) (West Supp. 1994). In addition, the agency must find that the
project proponent did not irreversibly commit resources to the project after it began the consultation process with
DFG. L § 2092(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994). In no event can the "feasibility" exemption allow an agency to
approve a project "which would likely result in [a listed species'] extinction .... "Id. § 2092(c) (West Supp.
1994).
211. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(G)-(O) (West 1985 & Supp. 1993). See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 48548 (1991) (noting
a spotted owl exemption process). See generally ZYGMUNT J. PLATER, ET AL. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY:
NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY 670-71 (1992) (describing "God Committee").
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for existing water rights holders.212 Similarly, the acts make no
distinction between the type of water right involved; thus, riparians, pre-
1914 appropriators, and even groundwater pumpers may face pumping or
diversion restrictions. 213 Where a "taking" under either act involves the
specific conduct of an identifiable pumper, such as entrainment of fish in
an irrigation district's pumps, that pumper faces liability.214 Where the
potential "taking" involves reductions by diversion of streamflow necessary
for a listed species' protection, however, apportionment of the burden of
pumping curtailment is unclear. Neither act speaks of the relative priorities
of rights holders. Arguably, under each act, if additional flows are
necessary to ensure a species' survival, then all diverters might be jointly
liable for the "take" and thus responsible to reduce their diversions pro
rata .15 Alternatively, and perhaps more consistently with western water
law's history of rights' prioritization, more recent rights' holders might
bear a higher proportion of reductions.216
212. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (ruling
that state water rights are no exception to ESA "take" proscriptions). In that case, the court concluded that the
ESA affected only the exercise of the district's appropriative rights, not the existence of the rights themselves.
Id.; see also Estes, supra note 198, at 1061-66 (concluding that overappropriation of water is a "taking" under
the ESA).
213. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 1993 WL 151353, at 6 (W.D. Texas, Feb. 1, 1993) (holding that pumping
from the Edwards aquifer impacted endangered species).
214. See Department of Fish and Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1554,
1568-69, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 230-31 (1992) (holding that the CESA supported an injunction against irrigation
district's diversions); Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. at 1135-36 (reaching a similar result under
the ESA).
215. Cf. D-1630, supra note 82, at 105 (imposing, under the public trust doctrine, flow restrictions without
considering chronological priority of rights). In the recently proposed federal Bay/Delta water quality standards,
the federal Environmental Protection Agency and the Bureau of Reclamation recommended that the State Water
Board implement the new standards across the full spectrum of water diverters. EPA, Proposed Water Quality
Standards for the Bay/Delta, 59 FED. REG. 810, 821-22 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131)
216. In times of shortage, no junior appropriator on a watercourse may take any water until any senior
appropriator on that watercourse has had its rights satisfied. HUTCHINS, supra note 15, at 131. In contrast, in
times of shortage, riparians generally share losses equally. Id. at 218-24. In an adjudication of an
overappropriated groundwater basin, however, the court has apportioned overall pumping reductions by reference
to the "equitable apportionment" factors used by the United States Supreme Court in interstate water allocation
disputes. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 265 n.61, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 n.61,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 49 n.61 (1975) (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)). Under these factors,
while temporal priority is important, it is only one of a multitude of equitable matters for the court to consider.
Id
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D. Water Quality Legislation
State and federal water quality legislation21 7 interacts with the water
allocation system in four primary ways. First, the water quality permit
processes limit the ability of a water diverter to return flows to the
watercourse.2 Absent an approved permit to discharge, a permit to
appropriate may be practically useless. Second, the water quality planning
processes may further limit diversions from a watercourse, if the permit
system is inadequate to meet desired water quality goals.219 The impact
of the water planning process on diversions from the Delta River system
has become a crucial battleground in the effort to strike some balance
between state water development and environmental protection goals.220
Third, the federal Clean Water Act requires certain federal projects to
obtain water quality certifications from the State Water Board.22 1 In
particular, questions have arisen surrounding the ability of the state to
qualify federally licensed hydropower projects with instream flow
protections to meet fish, wildlife, or other water quality goals. Finally, the
federal Clean Water Act also requires a permit before an appropriator can
dredge or fill wetlands.222 Controversies over the applicability of the
wetlands regulations have impacted many water diverters, and have led, in
two other states, to federal vetoes of planned dam and reservoir
projects.22'
217. The principal California water quality legislation is the Porter-Cologne Act. CAL. WATER CODE §§
13000-14075 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). The federal legislation is technically known as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, and popularly known as the "Clean Water Act." 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (,Vest 1986
& Supp. 1993).
218. See infra notes 224-238 and accompanying text (describing the water quality permit system and its
impact on water diversions).
219. See infra notes 239-279 and accompanying text (describing the water quality planning process and
its impact on water diversions).
220. See John Krautkraemer & Carl Boronkay, What the Bay/Delta Proceedings Reveal About the State
Water Resources Control Board's Powers and Procedures, 1 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RFrR. 3,3-8 (Oct. 1990)
(two separate articles, each bearing same title) (discussing the role of the water quality planning process in
addressing water needs in the Bay/Delta estuary); The Environmental Protection Agency's Role in the Bay/Delta
Proceedings: An Interview with Patrick Wright, EPA's Bay/Delta Program Manager, 2 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y
RpTR. 41,41-44 (Dec. 1991) (discussing the federal perspective on the environmental problems in the Bay/Delta
estuary).
221. See infra notes 280-299 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 300-309 and accompanying text.
223. James City County v. Environmental Protection Agency, 12 F.3d 1330, 1331-32 (4th Cir. Dec. 30,
1993) (reversing the trial court's decision overturning EPA § 404 veto of the Virginia Dam); 56 Fed. Reg. 76-02
(1991) (vetoing the proposed Two Forks Dam in Colorado).
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1. Discharge Permits
Both California and federal law protect water quality from harmful
discharges into a watercourse through a permit system.224 The state
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act establishes a system
whereby a designated regional water quality control board issues "waste
discharge requirements" that limit permissible discharges of waste that
"could affect the quality of the waters of the state.' 226 The regional
board may waive such requirements if "such waiver is not against the
public interest."227 An applicant for waste discharge requirements may
also have to undertake CEQA review, if the project meets the definition
of a "new source" for purposes of the federal Clean Water Act.228 The
issuance of waste discharge requirements does not create vested rights to
discharge.2 Moreover, nothing requires the appropriate regional board
to allocate a watercourse's entire waste assimilative capacity."
The federal Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA) has certified
the state's waste discharge requirement system as meeting the requirements
of the Clean Water Act's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits."3 The Clean Water Act requires an NPDES permit
before a "point source" can "discharge" a "pollutant" into "waters of the
224. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13260-13273.5 (West 1992
& Supp. 1994). See generally Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 996-1012 (describing state and federal
permit systems).
225. CAL. WATER CODE § 13020 (West 1992) (designating the state water quality control legislation as
the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act).
226. aid § 13260(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994); see also id. §§ 13050(d) (West Supp. 1994) (defining "waste");
id. § 13050(g) (defining "quality of the water"). The act sets up nine regional water quality control boards
charged with the act's initial implementation. Id. §§ 13200-13247 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
227. Id § 13269 (West 1992). The regional board may grant the waiver conditionally and may terminate
the waiver at any time. Id.
228. Id. § 13389 (West 1992); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, §§ 3733-3741 (1993) (describing CEQA
compliance and exemptions for waste discharge requirements). Under the Federal Clean Water Act, a "new
source" is any source constructed after the issuance of proposed regulations that impose heightened performance
standards for that type of source. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a)(2) (West 1986).
229. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(g) (West 1992).
230. Id. § 13263(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). See Attwater& Markle, supra note 15, at 1002 (discussing
the Board's ability to preserve assimilative capacity).
231. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 997-98, 1001-005 (discussing the interaction of state and
federal systems); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(B) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (stating requirements for EPA
approval of state administration of NPDES system); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370-13389 (West 1992) (state
compliance with federal permit law).
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United States.' ' 22 The principal feature of the NPDES system is a set of
technologically based limitations applicable to different classes of effluent
dischargers. 3 Given the federal certification of the California program,
initial responsibility for enforcement of the federal permit system rests
with the state.' The US-EPA retains ultimate authority to enforce the
federal requirements of the permit system.235
The waste discharge requirements system thus applies to any diverter
who will return diverted water to the watercourse from which it was
diverted. By definition, a water diverter who removes water from a
watercourse without returning any portion of the water to a watercourse is
not a "discharger. ' 1 6 Proponents of hydroelectric power plants may well
have to apply for discharge requirements, although "run of the river" plants
that return water to the watercourse from which it was removed may well
qualify for a waiver.237 Because NPDES system grants no vested right
232. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (requiring compliance with effluent
limitations established by § 1311); id. §§ 131 (a), (e) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (prohibiting point sources from
discharging of pollutants unless they are in accordance with effluent limitations); id. § 1362(1 1) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1993) (defining "effluent limitations"). Section 1362 defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,... from
which pollutants are or may be discharged:'Id § 1362(14) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). The definition expressly
excludes "agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture." Id; see Attwater &
Markle, supra note 15, at 997 (noting that the Porter-Cologne Act's waste discharge requirements apply to
agricultural return flows); see also 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1362(6) (West 1986) (defining "pollutant"); id. § 1326(7)
(West 1986) (defining "navigable waters"); id. § 1326(12) (West 1986) (defining "discharge of a pollutant").
233. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). These effluent limitations require a discharger to
meet one of the now famous acronyms such as "BAT' (best available technology), and "BPT' (best practicable
control technology). See id. § 1311 (b)(2)(A) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (describing "BAT'); id. § 131 1(b)(1)(A)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (describing "BPT").
234. See Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 1009-1012 (discussing the role of the state in enforcing
federal permit requirements).
235. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(i) (West 1986) (recognizing the EPA Administrator's authority to enforce the
Clean Water Act permit requirements notwithstanding certification of state programs).
236. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13260(a)(1) (West 1992) (imposing filing requirements only upon
"discharg[es] [of] waste.., that could affect the quality of the waters of the state"). Of course, if construction
of a water diversion project itself discharged waste into state waters, the project proponent would have to apply
for waste discharge requirements or a waiver. See 16 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 125, 130-31 (1950) (discussing the
authority of regional boards to impose waste discharge requirements on construction projects).
237. See Lake Madrone Water Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 209 Cal. App. 3d 163, 168-75,
256 Cal. Rptr. 894, 897-901 (1989) (noting that sediment release from a dam is a "discharge of waste"); 43 Op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 302, 303-04 (1964) (discussing the differences among various types of hydroelectric plants, and
noting that "run of the river" plants would ordinarily not discharge "waste;' unless the mechanical act of
discharging increased turbidity); see also Stuart L. Somach, The Excess in Environmental Regulation of the
Water Resource, 20 PAC. LJ. 337, 356 (1989) (noting that water quality certifications were often waived for
small hydroelectric projects until the mid-1980s). Water quality certifications, discussed infra, notes 280-299 and
accompanying text, include a determination of whether a regional board will impose, or waive, waste discharge
requirements. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 3857 (1993).
The Clean Water Act does not require a reservoir operator to get an NPDES permit, as ordinary releases
from dams are not considered "point sources" that trigger the federal permit requirement. National Wildlife Fed'n
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to discharge, the diverter remains subject to possible future reductions in
diversions if necessary to reduce discharges. Recent litigation involving
waste discharge requirements for water projects has arisen mainly in the
context of water quality certifications for hydroelectric power projects
licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 8
2. Water Quality Planning Process
Both the Porter-Cologne Act and the Clean Water Act mandate
comprehensive state planning to protect water quality goals."9 The
application of these two acts' requirements in the linchpin Bay/Delta
estuary has been the focus of nearly twenty years of administrative
proceedings involving the State Water Resources Control Board, the EPA,
and virtually every major water diverter and environmental organization
in California.240
The Clean Water Act requires each state to adopt "water quality
standards." 24' Such standards contain two components: 1) Identification
of "the designated uses of the navigable waters involved;" 242 and 2) "the
water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses."'243
"Designated uses" include drinking water, fish and wildlife purposes,
recreational purposes, agricultural purposes, industrial purposes, and
"other" purposes, including navigation.244  "Water quality criteria"
v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,585-88 (8th Cir. 1988). Of course, discharges during dam construction
would require a "section 404" permit. Monongahela Power Co. v. Marsh, 809 F.2d 41, 53 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). For a discussion of § 404 of the Clean Waters Act, see infra notes 300-309 and
accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Somach, supra note 237, at 355-57 (decrying increased difficulties of getting water quality
certifications for small hydroelectric plants); see also infra notes 280-299 and accompanying text (discussing
the water quality certification process and California's largely unsuccessful attempts to interpret broadly its
power to impose environmental conditions upon federally licensed hydroelectric plants).
239. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1313, 1288 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13170, 13240-13247
(West 1992). See generally Attwater & Markle, supra note 15, at 998-1000 (discussing the two water quality
schemes).
240. See, e.g., D-1630, supra note 82, at 6 n.1 (describing briefly the history of prior State Water Board
actions); see also id. at Table I (following page 121) (listing major water rights holders in the Bay-Delta
watershed); United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (Delta Water Cases) 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 110-
112, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 174-175 (1986) (summarizing the water quality proceedings up to 1978); Robie, supra
note 95 (discussing Delta Water Cases). See generally Alan B. Lilly, EPA's Emerging Role in Water Allocation
Decisions, 36 RoCKY MT. MN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-12 to 22-15 (1990) (discussing the implications of the EPA's
role in the Bay/Delta proceedings).
241. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(1) (West 1986).
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represent numerical or narrative descriptions of the levels of pollutants
allowable while still protecting the designated uses.245 The Clean Water
Act envisions that the states will undertake a continual process of water
quality standard formulation, implementation, and reformulation.
24 6
As with implementation of the NPDES permits discussed above, the
State Water Board has the initial responsibility in California to fulfill the
water quality planning required under the Clean Water Act.247 In addition
to the duty to promulgate "water quality standards" to meet Clean Water
Act requirements, the Porter-Cologne Act requires the State Board to
approve "water quality control plans." '24
The Porter-Cologne Act articulates its water quality planning
requirements somewhat differently from the Clean Water Act. Under the
Porter-Cologne Act, a "water quality control plan" has three elements.249
Each plan must designate: 1) Beneficial uses to be protected; 2) water
quality objectives; and 3) a program of implementation to achieve those
objectives.' Little difference appears between the Clean Water Act's
requirement of "designated uses" and the Porter-Cologne Act's requirement
of "designate[d] ...beneficial uses."'" Similarly, the Porter-Cologne
Act's express requirement for a "program of implementation" echoes many
of the Clean Water Act's required components of an approved "continuing
245. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (1992) (describing "criteria" as including "constituent concentrations, levels,
or narrative statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use."). A "narrative description"
might state: "no toxic pollutants will be allowed in any concentration" in a given watercourse. Certain listed
toxics must have numerical criteria or biological monitoring or assessment criteria. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B)
(Supp. 1993).
246. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3) (1986). Among other items, the continuing planning process must contain
plans for "effluent limitations and schedules of compliance . . . at least as stringent as any requirements
contained in any applicable water quality standard" and "adequate implementation, including schedules of
compliance, for revised or new water quality standards, under [§ 1313(c)]." Id. § 1313(e)(3)(A), (F) (1986).
247. See id. § 1313(c) (West 1986); CAL. WATER CODE § 13160 (West 1992) (designating the State Water
Board as the agency responsible for fulfilling federal water quality requirements); id. § 13170 (West 1992)
(authorizing the State Board to adopt water quality control plans to meet federal requirements).
248. CAL. WATER CODE § 13240 (West 1992). The regional boards develop the plans for State Water
Board approval. L §§ 13245, 13246 (West 1992).
249. L § 13050(j) (West Supp. 1994).
250. I § 13050(j)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1994).
251. Compare 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993) with CAL. WATER CODE § 130500)(1)
(West Supp. 1993) (setting forth the designated use portion of the Clean Water Act, and the designated beneficial
uses of the Porter-Cologne Act, respectively). The California "beneficial" use qualification expressly echoes both
water rights law's traditional "beneficial use" requirement, and the 1928 amendment's limitation of water rights
to "reasonable and beneficial uses." CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2. All of the illustrative uses under the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993), except for the catch-all "other purposes," would likely
meet California's express "beneficial use" requirement.
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planning process." 2 Some room for difference, however, exists between
the Porter-Cologne Act's formulation of "water quality objectives" and the
Clean Water Act's formulation of "water quality standards. '5 3
As noted above, the Clean Water Act's "water quality standards"
include a list of designated uses of a watercourse, and criteria to protect
those beneficial uses.2" The Porter-Cologne Act generally directs the
State Board to develop those "water quality objectives" that will "ensure
the reasonable protection of beneficial uses and the prevention of
nuisance. 2 55  Nevertheless, the Porter-Cologne Act's "water quality
objectives" require consideration of six specific factors. 6 These factors
include "environmental characteristics of the hydrographic unit under
consideration," "economic considerations," and "the need for developing
252. Compare CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13050(j)(3), 13246 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) with 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1313(e) (West 1986) (setting forth California's programs of implementation and the federal act's planning
process, respectively). Section 13242 lists three mandatory, but not exclusive, components of a "program of
implementation": 1) "[A] description of the nature of actions which are necessary to achieve the objectives,
including recommendations for appropriate action by any entity, public or private"; 2) "[a] time schedule for the
actions to be taken"; and 3) "[a] description of surveillance to be undertaken to determine compliance with
objectives:' CAL WATER CODE § 13242 (West 1992). The state's "surveillance," i.e., monitoring, requirement
is arguably implicit in the Clean Water Act's general requirement for "adequate implementation... for revised
or new water quality standards." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e)(3)(F) (West 1986). Both acts expressly require
"schedules" for compliance. Id § 1313(e)(3)(A), (F); CAL WATER CODE § 13242(b) (West 1992). The principal
difference between the two appears to be the Porter-Cologne Act's implicit recognition that certain actions
"necessary to achieve the [water quality control plan] objectives" may be beyond the powers of the State Water
Board. CAL. WATER CODE § 13242(a) (West 1992). Section 13242(a) requires the State Board to include in its
implementation plan "recommendations for appropriate action by any entity, public or private:' Id Implicitly,
this suggests that the State Board may itself lack the full power necessary to enforce its objectives. See United
States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 120-21, 123-25,227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 181, 183-
85 (1986). In contrast, the Clean Water Act requires the state as a whole to meet and develop the continuing
planning process necessary to meet the required water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e)(1) (West 1986).
One element of such a plan must be "adequate authority for intergovernmental cooperation." Id § 1313(e)(3)(E)
(West 1986). Such a requirement would seem to go beyond the Porter-Cologne's mere reference to the State
Board's ability to recommend some other governmental agency perform the steps necessary to meet the state
plan.
253. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993); CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(j) (West Supp. 1994).
In its recent Bay/Delta standards, the Environmental Protection Agency noted "EPA's and California's
longstanding practice to interpret the federal terms, 'designated uses' and 'water quality criteria,' as synonymous
with the state terms, 'beneficial uses,' and 'objectives."' United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Proposed Rule on Bay/Delta Standards, slip op. at 6 n.1 (Dec. 10, 1993). Despite this "longstanding practice,"
no judicial construction exists for the respective meanings of these two sets of terms.
254. See supra notes 241-245 and accompanying text.
255. CAL. WATER CODE § 13241 (West 1992); see id. § 13050(m) (West Supp. 1993) (defining nuisance
as public nuisance).
256. Md. § 13241(a)-(f) (West 1992).
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housing within the region." 7 The consideration of these factors in a
state water quality control plan might, in some cases, prevent a state water
quality control plan from meeting the Clean Water Act "water quality
standards."'
The application of the state and federal water quality statutes to the
Bay/Delta estuary has raised numerous questions about the interaction of
the two statutory schemes with the state water allocation system. The
principal water quality concerns in the Bay/Delta estuary do not involve
pollution in the conventional sense. Rather, both the instream and
consumptive beneficial uses of Delta waters depend upon salinity
issues.29 In addition, instream uses for fish raise questions about
temperature, and the timing and direction of water flows. 26° Given these
types of quality concerns, the twin state and federal pollutant discharge
permit systems are largely unavailable to protect the beneficial uses of the
Bay/Delta estuary.2 6 Rather, to a large extent, the protection of
257. Id § 13241(b), (d), (e) (West 1992). The other three factors are: (a) "[P]ast, present, and probably
future beneficial uses of water"; (c) "fenvironmental conditions that could reasonably be achieved through the
coordinated control of all factors which affect water quality in the area"; and (f) "[t]he need to develop and use
recycled water." Id. § 13241(a), (c), (f) (West 1992).
258. For example, the Porter-Cologne Act suggests that "it may be possible for the quality of water to be
changed to some degree without unreasonably affecting beneficial uses." CAL. WATER CODE § 13241 (West
1992). Application of this clause might prevent a state water quality objective from meeting the Clean Water
Act's "anti-degradation" policies. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)(4) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring standards to
protect clean water from degradation due to increased use of assimilative capacity). Similarly, the inclusion of
"economices" in the Porter-Cologne Act's articulation of water quality objectives might preclude such an
objective based-plan from meeting the Clean Water Act. See Wright Interview, supra note 220, at 43-44
(explaining that "[u]nder the federal Act, economics and other factors can be considered in designating uses, but
not in developing the water quality criteria necessary to protect those uses .... [u]nder state law, economics
can be considered throughout the process.")
259. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (Delta Water Cases), 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 107-
08, 115-120, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 172-73, 177-181 (1986); Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-12 to 22-13. See also D-
1630, supra note 82, at 46-50 (imposing flow requirements for fish);' see id., Table II (listing temperature &
chloride requirements). Without fresh water to push back the brackish water pulled up the estuary by tidal
actions, water in the delta may become too salty for domestic consumption and agricultural irrigation; Steinberg
& Schoenleber, supra, note 30, at 1144-45 (describing the Delta briefly and the problems excess salinity poses
for agricultural irrigation); see generally CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS CO ,mIssIoN, DELTA-ESTUARY:
CALIFORNIA'S INLAND COAST 27, 36-43, 72-73, 91-92, 117 (1991) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA'S INLAND COAST]
(describing Delta hydrology and the implications of water project activities on estuarine uses).
260. See, e.g., Delta Water Cases, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 107-08, 115-120, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73, 177-
181; Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-12 to 22-13; D-1630, supra note 82, at 46-50 (noting flow requirements for
fish) & Table II (illustrating temperature, chloride requirements).
261. See Delta Water Cases, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (stating that excess salinity
due to tidal water intrusion is not a "pollutant" or a "discharge" within meaning of NPDES system). The water
quality planning process operates as a backup to the permit system; if the effluent limitations established by the
permit system fail to protect water quality, the water quality standards give a state, and the EPA, additional
powers to assure water quality. Id.
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beneficial uses depends upon control of timing, amount, and direction of
flows entering the estuary.262
Ultimately, depending upon the level of protection required under the state
and federal acts, these flow needs may only be met by the diversion
restrictions, if any, that the State Water Board will put on water rights
holders who divert above the Delta.
The ongoing controversy over the application of the two water quality
acts to diversions above the estuary implicates four principal legal issues.
First, ongoing litigation challenges the State Board's failure to include flow
requirements within its "water quality control plan for salinity and
temperature." 3 Environmentalists have claimed that flows are required
in the plans themselves under federal law; others, however, argue that
flows are only implementation decisions.M
Second, unresolved by the 1986 Delta Water Cases is the scope of the
State Board's authority to implement its water quality powers through its
water rights powers. 265 Both that decision's discussion of reprioritization
of water rights26 and the subsequent State Water Board invocation of
public trust authority in Decision 1630267 demonstrate the potentially
broad sweep of the Board's water rights authority. Nevertheless, issues
involving apportionment of flow reductions among rights holders remain
for judicial determination. 8
Third, the EPA's ability to enforce its qwn water quality standards
remains uncertain. The EPA rejected the State Board's 1991 water quality
plan for salinity because it found that the plan inadequately protected the
The Board did issue its "pollutant policy document" to address some discharges, particularly of heavy
metals. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, POLLUTANT POLICY DocuMENT (1990).
262. CALIFORNIA'S INLAND COAST, supra note 259, at 38-43, 77-81, 91-92 (describing impacts of flows
on fish and location of "null zone").
263. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QuALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR
SALINITY, Executive Summary, at 5-6 (Jan. 1991); see Environmental Groups Sue Water Board over Adoption
of Water Quality Control PlanforSan Francisco Bay/Delta, 1 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 216 (Aug. 1991);
Clifford W. Schulz, Golden Gate Audubon v. State Water Resources Control Board: A Recipe for Federal
Entanglement in State Water Allocation, 2 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RmTR. 3 (Oct. 1991).
264. The plaintiffs in Golden Gate Audubon contended that the State Board must base its water quality
control plans on "environmental characteristics of the hydrographic unit" and "all factors which affect the water
quality in the area." Environmental Groups Sue Water Board Over Adoption of Water Quality Control Plan for
San Francisco Bay/Delta, I CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RYM. 216,216 (Aug. 1991). The State Board argues that
flows are addressed in water rights decisions, not water quality decisions. Schulz, supra note 263, at 5.
265. See Delta Water Cases, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 115-120, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 178-181.
266. lId at 133, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
267. D-1630, supra note 82, at 6 n.1.
268. See Kevin M. O'Brien, State Water Resources Control Board Draft Decision 1630: A Critique, 3
CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 101, 104 (Mar. 1993) (criticizing the decision for failing to use chronological
authority in imposition of public trust restrictions).
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estuary's striped bass fishery.269 After two years of study, the EPA
proposed its own water quality standards to protect the striped bass fishery
in the fall of 1993.270 At least as a practical matter, its ultimate ability
to enforce that standard is uncertain. The Clean Water Act allows the EPA
broad latitude to enforce NPDES requirements.271 Since those permits are
largely irrelevant to the Delta, the EPA may simply lack any ability to
enforce its water quality standards.272
Fourth, an additional question about EPA enforcement authority
involves the Clean Water Act's savings clause for state water rights. In
1977, Congress added a provision now known as the "Wallop
Amendment" after its sponsor.27 3  That provision announces three
congressional policies. First, Congress sought to avoid impairment of state
authority to allocate water.274 Second, Congress sought to avoid or
abrogate existing state created rights to water.275 Finally, Congress
sought to encourage federal agencies to cooperate with state and local
governments to "develop comprehensive solutions" that prevent pollution
and manage water resources.276
The meaning of this broad policy statement is disputed. On the one
hand, the EPA and others read it quite narrowly. 7  On the other hand,
some project operators have argued that the amendment further constrains
EPA's ability to order flow reductions.27 Although the United States
269. 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y ReTR. 33 (Nov. 1991); id. at 41 (Dec. 1991).
270. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule on Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg.
810, 810-12 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
271. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (summarizing EPA enforcement powers); see id. §
1342(d)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing the EPA to veto state approved NPDES permits); id. § 1319(a) (West
1986) (authorizing the EPA to enforce individual permits); id § 1342(c)(3) (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing the
EPA to decertify the state's authority to run the NPDES permit system). None of these powers, however, would
likely help EPA free up water flows for the estuary.
272. See Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-21 to 22-23 (describing limits to EPA enforcement authority). In its
recent proposed Bay/Delta standards, the EPA did not directly set flow criteria. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Proposed Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 813 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 131). Rather, it looked to the state to use the state's "full discretion to develop implementation measures
attaining [federally designated] habitat conditions, and [to exercise] full discretion over the allocation of water
necessary to achieve the criteria." Id. at 18-19.
273. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(g) (West 1986); see Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-25 to 22-28; 4 WATERS &
WATER RIGrM, supra note 190, at 179-184 (discussing the Wallop Amendment).
274. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(g) (West 1986).
275. Id
276. Id
277. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 810,
813 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. (stating that EPA finds the amendment largely a policy statement that
cannot nullify an explicit statutory directive); see also Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-26 (noting similar opinions).
278. Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-27 (summarizing arguments).
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Supreme Court has not addressed the matter, those courts that have, have
upheld the EPA's interpretation of the amendment. 9
3. Water Quality Certifications
Under the permit and planning processes, the EPA obtains ultimate
authority to enforce water quality limitations over the objections, or
inaction, of state agencies. In contrast, section 401 of the Clean Water Act
purports to give a state an ability to restrain federal agencies whose actions
may impact water quality in that state.280 That section requires federal
permit applicants whose project may discharge into the waters of a
particular state to obtain a "certification" from that state that "any such
discharge will comply with [Clean Water Act water quality
standards]."28' In addition, the section requires the federal permitting
agency to include within the permit conditions "any other appropriate
requirement of State law set forth in such certification." '282 The scope of
a state's ability to condition or restrict the issuance of such a certification
has been the subject of much recent controversy in California involving
federally licensed hydroelectric projects.283
In California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Rock
Creek),2  the Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Power Act
preempted California from imposing, in the water rights process, greater
flow bypass requirements upon a hydropower project than required by the
federal licensing agency. Rock Creek did not involve water quality
certification issues. Following that decision, the State Water Board
attempted to raise environmental considerations in the context of the
section 401 certification process. In particular, the State Board has required
279. United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1986); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews,
758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985).
280. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 1986).
281. Idt § 1341(a)(1) (West 1986).
282. d § 1341(d) (%Vest 1986).
283. See Somach, supra note 237, at 355-57 (arguing that environmental considerations imposed by the
state during the certification process unnecessarily duplicates federal environmental considerations); cf. Roderick
E. NValston, California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: New Roadblock to State Water Rights
Administration, 21 ENvTL. L. 89 (1991) (arguing that federal law inadequately addresses state environmental
considerations). See generally Andrew H. Sawyer, Rock Creek Revisited: State Water Quality Certification of
Hydroelectric Projects in California, 25 PAC. L.. 973 (1994) (discussing in detail the issues surrounding the
state's certification authority).
284. 495 U.S. 490 (1990). The name refers to the stream upon which the developers sought to build their
hydroelectric project. lad at 493.
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applicants for a water quality certification to comply with CEQA285 and
has attempted to condition streamflows.286 In two recent decisions,
however, the Ninth Circuit has again addressed the State Board's ability
to condition federally licensed hydropower projects.
In California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Dynamo
Pond),2 9' the Ninth Circuit considered section 401's requirement that
state certification be issued within a year after receipt of request for
certification.2 8  Prior to 1985, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) had interpreted the one year period to begin at the
time that the certifying agency had found the application for certification
"acceptable for processing." 89 Thus, if, for example, the State Board
insisted that CEQA documentation accompany the certification request, the
one year period would not run until such documentation was completed.
Concerned over the potential for prolonged delay, the FERC changed its
rule in 1987.290 Under the new rule, the one year period began running
on the date the certifying agency received the certification request.29' In
Dynamo Pond, the court upheld the new FERC interpretation.292
In Sayles Hydro Associates v. Maughan,293 the Ninth Circuit further
restricted the state's ability to require compliance with environmental law.
In that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the state lacks the power to
do anything but determine proprietary water rights."'2 9 The court
implicitly ruled that the State Board could not condition certification upon
CEQA compliance.295 Although not a section 401 case, the court's broad
preemption ruling, and its rejection of the state's ability to order studies,
285. Somech, supra note 237, at 356.
286. See Elizabeth B. Roth, Comment, Environmental Considerations in Hydroelectric Licensing:
California v. FERC (Dynamo Pond), 23 ENvTL. L. 1165, 1175 (1993).
287. 966 F.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1992).
288. Dynamo Pond v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 1541, 1552-54 (9th Cir. 1992).
289. Id at 1552.
290. ld
291. Id at 1552-53.
292. Id at 1556.
293. 985 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1993).
294. Sayles Hydo Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 452 (9th Cir. 1993).
295. The court did not mention CEQA by name. Nevertheless, it discussed the State Board's "shifting,
expanding range of reports and studies... [involving] recreation, aesthetics, archaeology, sport fishing, and
cultural resources." Id. at 453. These resources would normally be part of the CEQA review process.
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suggests the Ninth Circuit's unwillingness to read broadly "appropriate
state laws" upon which the State Board may condition certification.296
Any Ninth Circuit predisposition toward a narrow reading of state
water quality certification powers may well soon be moot. The United
States Supreme Court is currently reviewing a Washington State Supreme
Court decision that broadly construed that State's water quality
certifications authority over FERC licensed projects.297 In Washington
Dep't of Ecology v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1, the Washington Supreme
Court distinguished Rock Creek as solely a water rights matter and
concluded that the State's water quality certification power is not
preempted by the federal power act.298 The United States Supreme Court's
decision will hopefully resolve many of the outstanding issues involving
the extent of the state's power to condition a federally licensed
hydropower project through the water quality certification process.299
4. Wetlands Permits
The final major regulatory requirement placed upon water projects by
the Clean Water Act is the wetlands permit program.3° Section 404 of
that Act requires a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers before any
"discharge of dredged or fill materials into the navigable waters.3
°
Under Corps regulations, upheld by the Supreme Court, "navigable waters"
296. Id. at 454-56. If the State Board cannot order studies of a project's impact on certain resource values,
it is difficult to see how that court would uphold as an "appropriate requirement of state law" a State Board
substantive restriction in a certification in favor of a competing resource value. Further support for this
conclusion comes from the court's suggestion that the state's arguments bordered on the frivolous. Id. at 456.
Additional litigation is ongoing to determine the preemptive effect of the Federal Power Act on
multipurpose dams. Sawyer, supra note 283, at note 94 and accompanying text. Both the Rock Creek and Sayles
Flat projects were single purpose projects, i.e., they only produced hydropower. Id. A lawsuit between the State
Board and the Yuba County Water Agency seeks to test the preemptive effect of federal law on dams that store
water for agricultural and other uses, in addition to hydropower generation. Id.
297. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993), cert. granted,
62 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1993) (No. 92-1911).
298. Id. at 656-57.
299. See Sawyer, supra note 283, at 996-1008 (discussing the scope of the certification authority over
nonpoint source impacts, beneficial use protection, and "other appropriate requirements of state law").
300. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). See generally 5 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 190, at 556-573 (describing wetlands system); Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands
Protection Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for
Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 695 (1989) (critiquing the inadequacies of wetlands systems); Oliver A. Houck,
Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar
Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989) (arguing that environmental protection requires broad
assessment of available alternatives to filling wetlands).
301. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a) (West 1986).
955
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
include the freshwater wetlands "immediately adjacent" to "waters of the
United States."30 2
Most water projects will need to obtain a section 404 permit.3 The
permit applicant must comply with NEPA.3 0 In addition, it must
mitigate the impact of its activities.35  Finally, it must satisfy any
additional EPA concerns over a project's effects on "municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.' 3°
The broad scope of the Corps' definition has engendered enormous
controversy. In particular, two issues present are of particular concern in
the water allocation process. First, the EPA has asserted its ability to veto
water projects under section 4 04. o Indeed, since wetlands permits must
be renewed at least every ten years,0 8 this EPA veto could give the
Agency a "handle" in attempting to ensure that existing projects help meet
flow related water quality standards. Second, the extent of potential
restrictions on water dependent operations has led to loud claims of
"takings" requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.3 9
302. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985); 5 WATERS & WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 190, at 558-62.
303. Somach, supra note 237, at 357-58. "General permits," applicable to broad classes of permitted
activities with minimal impacts on the environment, are available in certain instances. 5 WATERS & VATER
RIGHTS, supra note 190, at 570-71.
304. 5 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 190, at 567.
305. Id. at 564 (text accompanying note 108).
306. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(c) (West 1986); 5 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 190, at 563-65.
307. James City County v. Environmental Protection Agency, 12 F.3d 1330, 1993 WL 539821 (4th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1993) (reversing the trial court's decision overturning EPA § 404 veto of Virginia Dam); 56 Fed. Reg,
76-02 (Jan. 2, 1991) (vetoing proposed Two Forks Dam in Colorado); see also Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-17
to 22-20, 22-24, and 22-26 (discussing the EPA's veto authority under § 404).
308. 33 C.F.R. § 325.6(e).
309. See, e.g., Lilly, supra note 240, at 22-28 to 22-30 (discussing takings issues); see also Katherine E.
Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Proposed Section 404 Amendments-A New "Taking" Clause for Wetlands (Why
Stick to the Constitution?), 3 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RPm. 219 (Aug. 1992).
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E. Wilderness Preservation Laws
1. Wild, Scenic & Recreational Rivers
Both state31° and federal3 .1 laws preserve designated wild, scenic,
and recreational rivers and river segments312  from incompatible
development. In general, both the California Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act31 3 and the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act314 contain
designated rivers and river segments, classified according to their particular
use values.315
Both the state and federal acts substantially restrict construction of
dams and water diversion facilities on included river segments. 6 The
California act prohibits the construction of virtually any "dam, reservoir,
diversion, or other water impoundment facility" on a designated stream
segment. 7 It does allow the Secretary of Resources to approve water
310. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-5093.69 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
311. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-1287 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
312. The two acts similarly define "wild," "scenic," and "recreational." Compare CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 5093.53 (West 1984) with 16 U.S.C.A. § 1273(b) (West 1985). "Wild" river segments are those "free of
impoundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or shorelines essentially primitive and
waters unpolluted." CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.53(a) (West 1984); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1273(b)(1) (West 1985).
"Scenic" river segments are "free of impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still largely primitive and
shorelines largely undeveloped, but accessible in places by roads." CAL Ptu. RES. CODE § 5093.53(b) (West
1984); 16 U.S.C.A. § 1273(b)(2) (West 1985). "Recreational" river segments are "readily accessible by road or
railroad, that may have some development along their shorelines, and that may have undergone some
impoundment or diversion in the past." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.53(c) (West 1984); 16 U.S.C.A. §
1273(b)(3) (West 1985).
313. CAL. Put. REs. CODE § 5093.51 (West 1984). See generally SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note
44, at 88-94 (discussing the California act).
314. Pub. L. 90-542, § l(a) (1968). See generally 2 GEORGE C. COGGINs & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN,
PuBuc NATuRAL RESOURCES LAW 15-2 to 15-13 (1993) (describing the federal act's principal features).
315. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1274 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.54-5093.546 (West
1984 & Supp. 1993). Federally protected river segments generally include a half mile wide corridor, measured
at a quarter mile from the ordinary high water mark of each river bank. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1275(d) (West
Supp. 1993) (designating the protected corridor for rivers proposed for inclusion in federal system).
The state act requires legislative designation of a component. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5093.546 (West
1984). The federal act, however, also allows administrative inclusion of a river segment upon the
recommendation of the governor of the state in which the river segment is located. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1273(a)(ii)
(West 1985). If the Secretaxy agrees, the rivers are included within the federal system, although administered
by the state. Id. This process led to the inclusion of five North Coast California rivers in the federal system in
the waning hours of the Carter administration. See County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462, 1467-
68 (9th Cir. 1982).
316. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1278(a) (West Supp. 1993); CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.55 (West Supp. 1994).
317. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5093.55 (West Supp. 1994). The act exempts temporary flood storage
facilities on the Eel River. Id. (citing California Public Resources Code § 5093.57). It also exempts temporary
summer recreational dams on included river segments in certain circumstances. lId § 5093.67 (West 1984).
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diversion facilities on included segments where "the facility is needed to
supply domestic water to the residents of the county or counties through
which the river and segment flows... [if] the facility will not adversely
affect the free-flowing condition and natural character of the river and
segment.,, 318 The federal act prohibits the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission from licensing any component of a hydropower project if
such a project would directly affect a designated component. 3 9 In
addition to direct prohibitions on the construction of most water projects
on included river segments, both acts restrict their respective government
agencies from assisting others to construct most such projects on included
river segments.320
Collectively, the two acts have set substantial portions of California's
presently undammed river segments off limits to further water development
321projects. In particular, both acts protect large segments of the largely
undammed North Coast rivers.3w At one time, possible development of
these rivers was a substantial portion of the California Water Plan.323
Against the possible charge that putting such substantial flows off limits
318. Id. § 5093.55(a) (West Supp. 1994). Section 5093.52(d) defines "free-flowing" as "existing or flowing
without artificial impoundment, diversion, or other modification of the river." Id. § 5093.52(d) (West 1984). The
act authorizes the Secretary of Resources to make the determination. Id. §§ 5093.52, 5093.55(a) (West 1984 &
Supp. 1994). The Secretary of Resources has delegated that decisionmaking power to the Department of Fish
and Game. SCHNEIDER, Instream Uses, supra note 44, at 91.
319. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1278(a) (West Supp. 1993). The statute expressly includes as prohibited components
"any dam, water conduit, reservoir, powerhouse, transmission line, or other project works under the Federal
Power Act .... "d
320. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1278(a) (West Supp. 1993) (barring any federal assistance to a project on an included
river that "would have a direct and adverse effect on the values for which such river was established .... ");
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 5093.56 (West Supp. 1994) (barring state assistance or cooperation "whether by loan,
grant, license, or otherwise .... "). The federal act also prevents a federal agency from recommending
authorization of such a project without first notifying the Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture and reporting
to Congress. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1278(a) (West Supp. 1993).
321. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.56 (West Supp. 1994); see id. §§ 5093.54,5093.545 (West Supp. 1994)
(designating portions of Klamath, Scott, Salmon, Trinity, Smith, Eel, Van Duzen, Lower American, North Fork
Feather, West Walker, and East Fork Carson rivers within California system). Numerous portions of California
rivers receive protection under the federal system. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1274(3), (21), (52), (53), (62), (63), (64)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (protecting the Middle Fork Feather, North Fork American, Tuolumne main stem,
Merced main stems, Middle Fork Kings, North and South Forks Kern rivers, respectively). In addition, section
1274 designates in unnumbered subsections portions of the Smith, Middle Fork Smith, North Fork Smith,
Siskiyou Fork Smith, South Fork Smith, Sespe Creek, Sisquoc & Big Sur rivers. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1274 (West
Supp. 1993).
322. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5093.54(a)-(c), (d) (West Supp. 1994) (protecting portions of the
Klamath, Trinity, Smith and Eel rivers respectively); see also County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d
1462, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding state requested, federal administrative inclusion of five North Coast
California rivers within federal system).
323. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (BULLETIN
No. 3) 166-77 (1957) (describing proposed North Coast components of State Water Project).
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might violate the 1928 constitutional amendment, the state legislature
expressly determined that such preservation was a reasonable and
beneficial use within the meaning of that amendment.2
Little reported litigation to date has addressed the scope of water
development projects that might be permissible under either the state or
federal acts.32 In addition to its positive restrictions on incompatible
water development projects, the Interior Department's Solicitor has
construed the federal act as having reserved sufficient water to accomplish
the federal act's purposes.
326
2. Wilderness Lands
In addition to the state and federal laws that directly preserve free-
flowing rivers, both state327 and federal 328 laws preserve wilderness
lands. While the state has preserved a relatively small amount of land,329
substantial California lands have been preserved as components of the
federal system.330 Unlike the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the
National Wilderness Act does not necessarily bar development of dams
and reservoirs within designated wilderness areas.33' To date, there have
been no reported attempts to locate a major water project in a federally
protected wilderness area in California.
324. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5093.50 (West 1984).
325. The only case on point appears to be Swanson Mining Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm.,
790 F.2d 96, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that FERC is subject to federal Wild & Scenic Rivers Act). Cf 60
Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 6 (1977) (opining that the Secretary of Resources has primary responsibility to determine
the adverse effects on a river segment.)
326. 86 Interior Dec. 553, 607-609 (1979). For a brief discussion of the reserved rights doctrine, and its
possible use for environmental purposes, see supra note 136.
327. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 5093.30-5093.40 (West 1984).
328. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-1136 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993).
329. See CATL PuB. REs. CODE § 5093.34 (West 1984).
330. See, e.g., Pub. L. 98-425, Title I, § 101(a)(13), (Sept. 28, 1984), 98 Stat. 1618, 1620 (expanding John
Muir Wilderness as part of 3.2 million National Forest acres in California added to the federal wilderness
preservation system). See generally 16 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (listing all components of
the wilderness system). There are almost 4 million acres of federal wilderness lands in California. JAMES S. FAY
& STEPHANiE W. FAY, ED., CALIFORNIA ALMANAC 147-155 (5th ed. 1991).
331. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1133(d)(4) (West 1985) (authorizing the President to allow water projects,
including supporting infrastructure, within wilderness areas if "such use or uses in the specific area will better
serve the interests of the United States and the people thereof than will its denial. . ."). See generally COGGINS
& GLICKsMAN, supra note 314, at 14-35 (noting that no U.S. president has ever authorized a water project in
a protected wilderness area). The California act does not contain a similar exception. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 5093.36 (West 1984).
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The federal wilderness system may impact water allocation in another
way. The effect of the reserved rights doctrine332 upon wilderness
designation remains unclear. If Congress addresses the scope of additional
rights reserved for wilderness purposes at the time of legislative
designation, then Congress' intent would govern the extent, if any, of such
reserved rights. To date, Congress has only expressly adopted wilderness
water rights reservation language in two statutes, neither of which involve
California.333 Absent such express intent, a controversy has existed over
the impact of wilderness legislation upon water rights. 4  The
congressional bills designating the National Forest wilderness areas in
California did not mention water reservation.335 Litigation over the scope
of reserved water rights for wilderness reservations reached an ambiguous
conclusion in Colorado.336 To date, this issue has not yet arisen in
California.337
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The intersection of the water allocation system with environmental
protection law prompts five broad, interrelated observations. First, it is
only a slight exaggeration to assert that water allocation law is largely
environmental law today. Parts II and III of this Article documented the
332. See supra note 136 (summarizing reserved rights doctrine).
333. See Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-195, 103 Stat. 1784, 1788 (1989);
Arizona Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469, 4473-74 (1990). Both these acts state that
they are not to be construed as evidencing congressional intent either to reserve, or not to reserve, water rights
in other wilderness areas.
334. E.g., COGGINS & GlICKSMAN, supra note 314, at 14-24 (discussing Colorado litigation over reserved
water rights for wilderness areas).
335. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-1134 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (containing no mention of reserved water
rights); Pub. L. 98-425, Title 1, § 101(a)(13), (Sept. 28, 1984), 98 Stat. 1618, 1620 (containing no mention of
reserved water rights in the California RARE II bill).
336. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990). In that case, the trial court had concluded
that wilderness reservation did include water rights reservation. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 863 (D.
Colo. 1985). See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1495-96 (D. Colo. 1987) (rejecting the United States'
showing of efforts to protect wilderness values). Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit reversed and concluded that the
matters were not ripe for adjudication. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1415-21.
337. The pending California desert lands bill, which designates as wilderness certain portions of the
southeastern California desert, expressly reserves water rights with a priority date as of the date of the bill's
enactment. S. 21, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. § 607 (1993). Like the Nevada and Arizona bills, supra note 333, the
California bill states that its reservation evinces no congressional intent either to reserve, or not to reserve, water
in other wilderness areas. S. 21, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 607 (1993). As most of the appropriable surface water
has likely already been appropriated in this desert area, the only likely impact of this bill, if any, is on
groundwater rights. Cf. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1976) (holding that the reservation of
Devil's Hole National Monument in Death Valley reserved unappropriated groundwater).
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magnitude of the role that environmental considerations play in both the
initial decision to grant a water right, as well as the continued exercise of
a water right. A review of the published decisions over the last twenty-five
years demonstrates the impact of these laws in litigation involving the
rights and use of California waters. About thirty percent of the California
Supreme Court water cases over the last twenty-five years have had
environmental considerations either at the core of the law in controversy,
or as the instigation for the lawsuit. 38 A review of the California Courts
of Appeal finds environmental matters central to over half of the reported
cases. 39 An even higher percentage of published federal decisions have
338. In the last 25 years, the California Supreme Court has decided only 7 water law cases involving
someone's right to divert water. 1) In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys., 44 Cal. 3d 448, 472, 749 P.2d 324,
338, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 901 (1988) (holding that the United States has riparian rights on federal land reserved
for national forest purposes); 2) National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419,452, 658 P.2d 709,
732, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 369 (1983) (finding that the public trust doctrine applies to appropriated water); 3) the
"EDF Cases," Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. District, 26 Cal. 3d 183, 200, 605 P.2d 1,
10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 475 (1980) (upholding standing of environmental organizations to challenge planned
point of diversions); 4) In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 358-60, 599 P.2d 656,
668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 361-63 (1979) (holding that in a stream wide adjudication, unexercised riparian
rights could be given lower priority); 5) City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207-09,
537 P.2d 1250, 1258-60, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9-11 (1975) (pertaining to groundwater rights in overdrafted basins);
6) People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 311,605 P.2d 859, 867, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 37 (1980) (holding that there
are no prescriptive rights as against the State); and 7) Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 149,
429 P.2d 889, 900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1967) (finding that gravel deposition is an unreasonable water use).
Of these, only National Audubon Society and the EDF Cases were concerned primarily with the impact of
environmental considerations on water allocation. Environmental considerations were not far from the Hallett
Creek litigation, as the United States sought to assert riparian rights for wildlife enhancement purposes. Cf.
People v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 232-33, 625 P.2d 239, 252-53, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 709-10
(1981) (determining the extent of a public trust easement); People v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240,
249, 625 P.2d 256, 261-62, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718-19 (1981) (determining the extent of a public trust
easement); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 263-64, 491 P.2d 374, 383, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 799 (1971)
(determining the scope of public trust uses).
To the extent that the California Supreme Court cases have elevated the power of the state to declare
certain water uses wasteful or unreasonable, or to give them a lower priority than might otherwise be their due,
the Court has indirectly advanced similar declarations or reprioitizations based on environmental considerations.
See Joslin, 67 Cal. 2d at 140, 429 P.2d at 894, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (1968) (stating that reasonable use will be
decided case by case by considering statewide matters of transcendent importance); Long Valley, 25 Cal. 3d at
358-60, 599 P.2d at 668-669, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 561-63 (upholding State Water Board's powers to reprioritize
dormant riparian rights in stream wide adjudications).
339. In the last 25 years, not counting those opinions superseded by California Supreme Court authority,
and disputes over contractual entitlements to water, the intermediate appellate courts have published opinions
in roughly a dozen and a half major water allocation disputes: 1) the "reservoir release" cases, Nacimiento
Regional Water Mgt Advisory Comm. v. Monterey Cty Water Resources Agency, 15 Cal. App. 4th 200,201-02,
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 1-2 (1993) (holding that annual reservoir operations are not subject to CEQA) and Leach
v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. App. 3d 389,395, 269 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1990) (holding that drafting of water
from one reservoir to another was not subject to CEQA); 2) Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-
Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (ACID), 8 Cal. App. 4th 1554, 1561-63, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226-27 (1992)
(holding that provisions of the Endangered Species Act did not proscribe only hunting or fishing related activity);
3) the "liD Cases," Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (lID I), 225 Cal. App. 3d 548,
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environmental matters at or near the core of the parties' disputes."
562-63, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 260-61 (1990), Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd, (liD
11), 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1163 n.4, 231 Cal. Rptr. 283, 284 nA (1986) (finding that the State Water Board
has jurisdiction, under 1928 amendment, over pre-1914 appropriative rights), and Elmore v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist., 159 Cal. App. 3d 185, 199, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1984) (upholding challenge to district's drainage
practices); 4) Big Bear Municipal Water Dist. v. Bear Valley Mutual Water Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 363, 375-76,
379, 254 Cal. Rptr. 757, 764, 766 (1989) (holding that neither the state constitution nor the public trust doctrine
gave trial court jurisdiction to modify physical solution injunction); 5) Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal.
App. 3d 74, 88, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 750 (1986) (holding that in a groundwater adjudication, the superior court
lacks authority to reprioritize unexercised overlying rights); 6) the "Cal Trout Cases," California Trout, Inc. v.
State Water Resources Control Bd. (Cal Trout 1), 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 592-93, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186-87
(1989) (holding that the City of Los Angeles required to comply with Fish Game Code section 5937); California
Trout, Inc. v. State W1hrater Resources Control Bd. (Cal Trout 11), 201 Cal. App. 3d 552, 247 Cal. Rptr. 259, 260
(1988) (holding that the City of Los Angeles was required to comply with California Fish Game Code § 5937);
7) Golden Feather v. Thermalito Irrig. Dist., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 837 (1989)
(holding that the public trust not applicable to artificial watercourse); 8) the "Delta Water Cases," United States
v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986) (pertaining to the impact
of water quality planning on delta diversions); 9) Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 137,
149 173 Cal. Rptr. 751, 758 (1981) (reversing findings of waste absent special canal lining); 10) People ex. rel
State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 749, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (1976) (ruling
that the State Water Board has jurisdiction under 1928 amendment over riparian diversions); 11) the Instream
Flows Cases, Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 597, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518,
523 (1979) (finding that there are no instream appropriations for fish absent diversion), California Trout v. State
Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 821, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 673 (1979) (finding that there are
no instream appropriations for fish absent diversion); 12) Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v.
Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1000-01, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (1975) (reversing application of mutual
prescription doctrine in groundwater adjudication); 13) Niles Sand & Gravel Co., v. Alameda County Water
Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 934, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 853 (1974) (holding that groundwater pumping interfered
with conjunctive use program); 14) Murphy Slough Assoc. v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649, 657, 104 Cal. Rptr.
136, 143 (1972) (upholding finding that deed did not sever riparian rights); 15) the "Inyo County Cases," Inyo
County v. Yorty (Inyo 1), 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973), through Inyo County v. Los Angeles
(Inyo IV), 78 Cal. App.3d 82, 144 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1978) (presenting CEQA challenges to planned groundwater
exports from Inyo County); 16) Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 584-85, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 446,449-50 (1971) (reviewing claims of waste from irrigation canal seepage); and 17) the Coastside cases,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695,706-09, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197,
203-05 (1972) (requiring water district to supplement EIR on water supply and storage construction project) and
Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside County Water Dist., 28 Cal. App. 3d 512, 513, 104 Cal. Rptr. 714,
714-15 (1972) (finding supplemental EIR adequate). See also Fogerty v. California, (Fogerty II), 187 Cal. App.
3d 224, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986) (discussing more public trust calculations); People v. Weaver, 147 Cal. App.
3d Supp. 23, 38, 197 Cal. Rptr. 521, 531 (1983) (upholding a challenge to the California Fish and Game Code
provisions barring obstruction of waterways). Of these 17 major disputes, over half have directly involved the
impact of environmental considerations on water allocation and use system: the reservoir release cases, ACID,
Big Bear, the Cal Trout Cases, Golden Feather, Delta Water Cases, the Instream Flow Cases, the Inyo County
Cases, and the Coastside cases.
340. Since 1968, almost all of the federal cases involving California water rights or projects have involved
environmental laws. Since 1978, there have been three United States Supreme Court cases: California v.
F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. 490,506 (1990) (holding that California's requirements for minimum stream flow for a river
on which a federally licensed hydroelectric project was located were preempted by the Federal Power Act);
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983) (maintaining the "practicable irrigable acreage" standard to
determine Indian water rights); and California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 667-669 (1978) (holding that
under the Reclamation Act of 1902, a state may impose any condition on control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water in a federal reclamation project which is not inconsistent with congressional directives of
the project). The first of these cases, California v. F.E.R.C., arose because of the state's attempt to add instream
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More importantly, the qualitative impact of the various courts' and
administrative agencies' decisions lies beyond the sheer number of
published decisions involving environmental matters. The National
Audubon Society's "public trust" ruling articulated an entirely new set of
largely environmental considerations applicable to all water rights in the
state, and largely shielded from Fifth Amendment takings review.
flow requirements largely for environmental concerns. F.E.R.C., 495 U.S. at 493-96. California v. United States
involved the state's attempt to keep New Melones reservoir from being filled before the Bureau of Reclamation
had contracts to sell water from that reservoir. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1978). The
state's decision to prevent the dam's premature filling temporarily kept the river open for rafting. Il at 651-53.
Since 1968, without considering cases involving the Reclamation Reform Act, the Ninth Circuit has
decided nearly a dozen California water rights and hydropower cases: 1) Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh
Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the San Luis Act did not require that the Bureau of
Reclamation satisfy water needs of San Luis water service contractors before diverting water to holders of
downstream water rights); 2) Wackerman Dairy, Inc. v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
in adjudicating water rights, courts must look to state law unless it conflicts with explicit congressional
directives); 3) Sayles Hydro Assocs. v. Maughan, 985 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Federal
Power Act preempted authority of the State Board to require a permit); 4) California v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm. ("Dynamo Pond"), 966 F.2d 1541, 1552-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that FERC regulations
properly restricted time for water quality certification to one year from date of request); 5) National Audubon
Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments preempted any federal common-law claims); 6) La Flamme v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm., 852 F.2d 389,403 (9th Cir. 1988) (suspending construction of hydropower project pending
completion of NEPA review); 7) South Delta Water Agency v. United States, 767 F.2d 531,536 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding jurisdiction in water rights holders' suit for violations of their rights by state and federal water projects);
8) County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462, 1465-66 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding designation of Wild
and Scenic rivers despite trivial NEPA noncompliance); 9) Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d
1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting NEPA challenge to dam construction project); 10) May v. Nevada
Irrigation Dist., 600 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding finding that plaintiff's right to irrigation water
was severable from the rights of other landowners); and 11) Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487
F.2d 814, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding finding that supplemental EIS for New Melones dam was adequate).
As noted above, environmental considerations indirectly triggered the litigation in Sayles Hydro and Dynamo
Pond. See supra notes 280-299 and accompanying text (discussing water quality certifications). The National
Audubon case raised Clean Water Act issues and the following four cases raised NEPA challenges: La Flamme,
County of Del Norte, Warm Springs Dam Task Force, and Armstrong.
Over the last 25 years, not counting decisions leading to full Ninth Circuit opinions, and acreage limitations
decisions under the Reclamation Act, the District Court has also decided a half dozen water rights and project
matters. Almost all of these have involved environmental considerations: 1) Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1431-32 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that California law, determining the amount
of water necessary for in-stream uses, was applicable to the Bureau of Reclamation under section 8 of the
Reclamation Act); 2) United States v. California, 509 F. Supp. 867, 887 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (finding on remand
from Supreme Court in New Melones litigation that conditions imposed on permits issued pursuant to application
to operate reclamation projects were binding upon the United States and its agencies were consistent with
congressional directives); 3) County of Trinity v. Andrus, 438 F. Supp. 1368, 1388-91 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (finding
that ongoing reservoir operations required no NEPA review); 4) Homeowners, Emergency Life Protection
Comm. v. Lynn, 432 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (upholding adequacy of EIS for proposed Los
Angeles dam and reservoir); 5) Environmental Defense Fund v. Stamm, 430 F. Supp. 664, 668 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(upholding adequacy of EIS for San Felipe Division of Central Valley Project); and 6) Sierra Club v. Morton,
400 F. Supp. 610, 650-51 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (requiring NEPA and CEQA review for construction of major
California water facilities).
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Similarly, the endangered species and water quality issues have impacted
the delta water diversions - the hub of the California water wheel.3 4
The second major observation from the above survey of environmental
considerations in the water allocation and use system involves the
federalization of California water allocation decisions. To an increasing
extent, federal environmental law is determining water allocation in
California. As a matter of substantive law, the federal Endangered Species
Act and the federal Clean Water Act probably have the greatest overall
potential to determine water allocation in the critical Bay/Delta estuary and
river system. While the state's public trust doctrine and constitutional
"reasonableness" requirement are powerful tools, both ultimately admit the
possibility of a discretionary, multifaceted balancing among competing
water use values. 342 Similarly, as noted above, the state's Porter-Cologne
Act arguably allows greater consideration of economics in its water quality
planning process than the federal Clean Water Act.343 In contrast, neither
the federal Endangered Species Act, nor the Clean Water Act, admit as
much of a balance between, for example, fish and consumptive uses. The
Endangered Species Act is the strongest example of a virtually unbending
federal legislative prioritization of a water use. Absent a rare exemption
from the Endangered Species Committee, both the anti-jeopardy and the
anti-take provisions discussed above are virtually unbending in their
application, regardless of the apparent impact on other resource users.
The administration of the state substantive laws, when compared to the
federal laws, highlights an additional element in the federalization of
California water allocation. For example, given the central role of the State
Water Board in the initial discretionary application of the public trust
doctrine, constitutional reasonableness, and the non-federally mandated
elements of the Porter-Cologne Act, all three state laws are ultimately
341. See supra notes 196-216, 239-278 and accompanying text (discussing the endangered species and
water quality acts).
342. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 445-47, 658 P.2d at 727-728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65
(holding that public trust needs to be considered and, to extent possible, accommodated, but harm to trust
protected values may be inevitable); Delta Water Cases, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 129,227 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (stating
that State Board has authority to balance competing uses). Cf. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 40 , 420-21,
432 P.2d 3, 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1967) (holding that in exercise of public trust authority, state has
authority to promote one trust use-commerce-over another-navigation).
343. See supra note 258 (comparing the use of economic factors under both the state and federal statutory
scheme).
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constrained by statewide political considerations3 44 In contrast, since
federal agencies are ultimately responsible for the implementation of the
federal Endangered Species and Clean Water Acts, the federal decision
makers remain, at least in theory, more removed from statewide water
politics. In short, given the greater importance of federal law in impacting
water allocation, the identity of the critical decision makers has also shifted
from the state towards the federal government.
The recent Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) highlights
both elements of the environmental federalization of California water
allocation.34' True, the CVPIA commits the Bureau of Reclamation to
operate the project in accordance with state law and the orders of the State
Water Board.3 6 Nevertheless, the federal decision to comply fully with
state law itself is but an additional instance of a federal decision maker
choosing to impact the allocation of water in California in a manner not
necessarily mandated otherwise by state law.347  Moreover, the
substantive terms of the CVPIA demonstrate a profound federal
commitment of water for environmental purposes. The CVPIA mandated
a programmatic environmental impact statement that allows the federal
government to consider the environmental consequences of the entire CVP
operations?4' More specifically, the CVPIA dedicated 800,000 acre-feet
of project water for environmental purposes. 349 In addition, the CVPIA
expressly authorizes operation of the project for the protection and
enhancement of fish and wildlife.3" The elevation of these values,
combined with the Bureau of Reclamation's announced mission of
reorientation from water development to resource management and
344. Of course, the state judiciary ultimately can review the State Water Board's determination of
reasonable use and public trust matters. E.g., NationalAudubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at448-51,658 P.2d at 729-32,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68 (holding that courts have concurrent jurisdiction with State Water Board over public
trust matters). Nevertheless, absent arbitrary State Board action, the courts will likely defer to the Board's
determination. See, e.g., Delta Water Cases, 182 Cal. App. at 129, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Moreover, the
appointment and retention of state judges is not entirely immune from state based political control, as state
appellate judges are all appointed by the Governor, and all judges within the state need to sit for retention
elections. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 7, 16 (discussing the Commission on Judicial Appointments and election of
judges respectively).
345. Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA), Pub. Law No. 102-575, § 3401-12, 106 Stat. 4706
(1992); see supra note 108 (outlining the CVPIA).
346. CVPIA § 3406(b), 106 STATS. at 4714.
347. See supra note 157 (discussing the Reclamation Act, § 8).
348. CVPIA § 3409, 106 STATS. at 4730.
349. Id § 3406(b); 106 STATS. at 4714-21.
350. Il § 3406(a), 106 STATS. at 4714.
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environmental mitigation35 ' has led to what some have called "Club
Fed. 35 2 Prior to these developments, the dambuilding mission of the
Bureau of Reclamation was often at odds with the fish and wildlife
protection missions of its Department of Interior compatriots at the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and their compatriots at the Department
of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service.353 Today, a previously
inconceivable alliance between those historical rivals, together with the
federal Environmental Protection Agency, is emerging as an operational
reality. While the alliance largely remains inchoate, its strategic
implications may be profound. If it sticks, no longer will the large state
and local projects necessarily have the powerful, and well funded Central
Valley Project as their allies in disputes with the State Water Board and
federal EPA, or the state and federal fish protection agencies.354
The environmental federalization of California water law presents a
mixed bag of benefits and detriments to both the environment and the
water allocation process. On the one hand, to the extent that the state has
been unwilling to restrike a balance between water development and
environmental considerations, the federal government has the ability to
strike that balance for the state. Both the CVPIA and the recent EPA
Bay/Delta proposals demonstrate the federal government's attempt to
351. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AssESSMEsNT'87: A NEW
DIRECTION FOR THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (Sept. 1987) (shifting Bureau from dam building to resource
management, including mitigation of environmental impacts of Bureau projects).
352. The proposed federal Bay/Delta standards demonstrate this united federal front. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule on Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 810 (1994) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131) (stating that the "EPA has worked closely with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
... [to produce] this interagency initiative .... ).
353. To date, the Army Corps of Engineers apparently has not yet joined the "Club."
354. Of course, to the extent the Bureau is willing to change its operations to meet State Water Board
demands more readily than its state based counterparts, those state diverters may look to the Bureau to bear a
greater share of environmentally necessitated operational changes.
The CVPIA may have had an additional impact on the environmental federalization of California water
allocation. During the Bush administration, talk emerged over the possible transfer of the CVP operations to the
State. State Takeover of the Central Valley Project: Three Perspectives, 2 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 173,
175 (June 1992). Never very far advanced, those talks are now dead. See Michael Doyle & Pamela J. Podger,
State Dealt Major Blow In Effort To Take Over CVP, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al. The end
of the transfer discussions may have been due in part to the change of administration in Washington. The
limitations on the CVP placed by the CVPIA, however, would likely have reduced greatly the operational
flexibility that was one of the likely reasons California wished to take over the project. In any event, even were
the current administration interested in reviving the transfer talks, it seems that Congress would so easily undo
its CVPIA work by allowing a transfer without those or other restrictions in place. Moreover, even if a transfer
law were enacted that mandated the same kinds of environmental considerations in CVP operations, Congress
would likely view with some distress its inability to oversee the enforcement of those considerations under a
federal agency.
966
1994 / Environmental Law in Water Allocation & Use System
restrike that balance in greater favor of environmental values than of
consumptive values. On the other hand, at least for the Bay/Delta
quagmire, the ultimate effect of the federal actions may simply mean more
delay. The proposed EPA standards recognize that it is up to the state to
implement the standards. 55 Untold possible delay may well occur as the
respective state and federal agencies, as well as other water interests,
thrash out the mechanics of this implementation program. Of course, the
state's own track record on this matter is shoddy, as the State Water Board
has dragged out the Bay/Delta water quality planning process for over
seven years since the Court of Appeal's 1986 decision in the Delta Water
Cases. 6 Nevertheless, the now heightened federalization of the process
has added an inauspicious political wrinkle to the process. Instead of
facing the reallocation choices before it squarely and responsively, the state
can pass the buck to the federal agencies. In so doing, the state not only
may foster greater delay through interjurisdictional wrangling, but also may
attempt to force the federal government to "play the heavy" and bear the
political consequences of any reallocation decision.357 Such abdication
of state responsibility trades possible progress on long term solutions to
fundamental state infrastructural and quality of life problems for short term
political gain.
The third broad observation acknowledges that the California water
allocation system is primarily concerned with water reallocation, 358 and
that environmental concerns are a major impetus for those
reallocations. 59 Of course, the history of environmental opposition to
355. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule on Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg.
810, 821-22 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131).
356. Originally, the State Water Board contemplated a 1990 completion to a three year water quality and
water rights process to protect the Bay/Delta. See CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
WORKPLAN FOR THE HEARING PROCEsS, 34 (Feb. 1987). It is now seven years after the original workplan was
released, and there is no scheduled date for completion of the water rights phase of the proceedings.
357. Governor Wilson's April 1993 command to the State Water Board to stop its work on interim
protection of the Delta provides direct evidence that at least some in his administration would rather the federal
government take any heat for water reallocation issues. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to John
Caffrey, Member, State Water Resources Control Board, 3 CAL WATER L. & POL'Y RPTR. 152 (May 1993).
That letter expressly referenced the federal Endangered Species Act's limitations on the SWP and CVP as a
principal reason for the state to avoid additional standard setting efforts. Id. Following the Governor's letter, the
State Board declined to adopt its final version of Decision 1630. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Proposed Rule on Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 812 (1994) (40 C.F.R. § 131).
358. See, e.g., CAL WATER CODE §§ 1205-1207 (West Supp. 1994) (listing streams that are fully
appropriated); Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing and Instream Flows, 9 STAN. ENVT..
LJ. 132, 180 (1990) (discussing transferability of CVP water).
359. Schulz & Weber, supra note 21. That article also acknowledges that some water reallocation might
simply involve a shift from a lower valued to a higher valued consumptive use. Id. at 1106-09.
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water projects goes back at least as far as the Hetch Hetchy
controversy.36  It is perhaps not entirely coincidental that environmental
laws first began impacting water allocation around the time that the major
water projects had already been completed. As the white water resource
was virtually eliminated by the more than 1300 dams in California, the few
remaining undammed major streams in California became the focus of
strong preservation drives.36' With the North Coast rivers now off limits
to development, no large "on stream" storage sites are readily available for
additional, large scale water development. 362 Thus, the meeting of any
additional demands for water, whether for environmental, urban, or
agricultural use, will ultimately only come from some other user's loss or
transfer of a right. The net effect of many of the environmental laws, in
this zero sum water game, will be a legally mandated transfer of water
from a prior agricultural or urban use.363 These mandated reallocations
are only beginning to be seen, with the State Water Board's draft D-1630
decision but are the first of a likely series of changes occurring under the
public trust doctrine. Other likely mandated environmental reallocations
will occur in the Mono Lake basin, and the combined effect of the Clean
Water Act and the federal Endangered Species Act may mandate additional
reallocations in the Bay/Delta system.
The fourth broad observation involves the fragmentary system of
substantive law. Two examples, drawn from the federal Endangered
Species Act (ESA) and the Clean Water Act, demonstrate the incomplete,
360. See, e.g., Harold Gilliam, The Sierra Club's First Century, S.F. CHRON., April 19, 1992, at ZI
(discussing John Muir's unsuccessful fight against Hetch Hetchy Dam); see also Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773,
808-10 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (holding that commercial fishers lack standing under California Fish and Game Code
§ 5931 to challenge Friant Dam's effect on San Joaquin river fish).
361. The history of major dam construction in California shows that only 11 major reservoirs were
completed in California after 1970. BULLE71N 160-87, supra note 74, at 22-23. Prior to 1970, 93 were
completed. Id.; cf. County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding
five North Coast rivers' inclusion in federal Wild & Scenic Rivers system); Court Upholds State's Right To
Control Water Resources, WASH. POST, July, 4, 1978, at A7 (stating that the United States Supreme Court
upheld efforts of California state officials to impose conditions on the use of water in the federal government's
New Melones Dam).
362. Even the "offstream" storage possibilities for increasing state water project yield face environmental
obstacles. See Memorandum from Acting Field Supervisor, Ecological Services, United States Fish & Wildlife
Service, to Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation 1-2, 22-23 (Sept. 3, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific
Law Journal) (noting the presence of the endangered San Joaquin kit foxes on a proposed offstream storage
reservoir site).
363. The recent agreement between the City of Los Angeles and various environmental and state groups
may show that some water reallocations may not be zero sum games. In that agreement, construction of a waste
water reclamation facility will produce "new" supplies to substitute at least partially for the reduction in Mono
Basin diversions. See Marla Cone, Pact to Cut Diversions from Mono Lake, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 14,
1993, at B5.
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and sometimes incoherent integration of environmental law and the water
allocation system. 64 The ESA demonstrates that conflicts may arise
within the same statutory scheme. The ESA focuses its protection species
by species. It gives absolutely no guidance for resolving potential conflicts
among protection schemes for different species. One potential conflict of
importance to California water planning involves the proposed listing of
the Sacramento giant garter snake. That snake apparently prefers warm,
slow moving water. 65 Efforts to provide that species with the habitat it
prefers may run afoul of efforts to provide the swifter, colder water
preferred by endangered winter-run chinook salmon."
Even if interspecies conflicts can be resolved within the ESA's
regulatory framework,367 other aspects of the Act mesh poorly with the
364. Additional examples might include the exalted role given to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in the water allocation and use process, the calculation of "environmental water," and the
problems of agricultural return flows in the San Joaquin Valley. As noted above, the Federal Power Act
preempts a state from imposing in its water rights process any requirements on a federally licensed hydropower
project. See supra notes 280-296 and accompanying text. Of course, FERC considers Department of Fish and
Game and United States Fish and Wildlife Service recommendations during its licensing process. 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 662 (a) (West Supp. 1993); 4 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 190, at 364. Nevertheless, it remains
the ultimate decisionmaker. FERC's paramount role undercuts the ability of the State Water Board to rationally
allocate water uses within a stream system, and elevates hydropower production to a preferred position over
other competing instream values.
As for the calculation of "environmental water," it is unclear whether the water dedicated by the CVPIA
to fish and wildlife purposes includes water otherwise required to be released to meet state and federal water
quality or species laws, or is in addition to it. Similarly, recent water transfer legislation authorized transfers for
instream purposes. CAL WATER CODE § 1707 (West Supp. 1994). The statute does not, however, address how
such dedicated water can be earmarked as additional water that would not otherwise be in the watercourse.
As for agricultural return flows in the San Joaquin Valley, the water development projects originally
contemplated that a drain would take such flows from the Valley to the Delta for eventual flushing at sea. See
Attwatter & Markle, supra note 15, at 1025-26. The expense and environmental impact of such a drain now
make completion of such a project highly unlikely. Various proposals have been offered to address the problem,
including sale of water rights accompanied by retirement from irrigated agricultural production of the most
troublesome land. See generally GREGORY A. THOMAs & MICHELLE LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, LEGAL AND
INSTTUTiONAL STRuCFUREs FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY:
DESIGNING A FUURE, 111-11, 111-30, V-3 (San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program) (Sept. 30, 1990).
365. See United States Department of Interior, Fish & Wildlife Service, Proposed Rule, 56 Fed. Reg.
67046 (Dec. 27, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17) (noting that the giant garter snake likes sloughs, ponds, small
lakes, and low gradient streams; all these water bodies would tend to have slower moving and warmer water
than a fast moving stream).
366. Telephone Conference with G.R. Leidy, giant garter snake expert, Feb. 2, 1994, (notes on file with
the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that there is the possibility of conflicts between the needs of the snake for
water to remain in the rice fields favored by the snake, and the apparent needs of salmon and the delta smelt
that waters remain flowing instream).
367. Recently, the notion of multi-species "biodiversity" protection, focusing on keeping ecosystems
"healthy," has emerged as a popular concept. E.g., Craig Manson, Preserving Biodiversity through Ecosystem
Conservation: California's Natural Community Conservation Approach, 3 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPIR. 165
(June 1993); Andrea Foster, House Expected To Approve Funding For Gnatcatcher, STATES NEWS SERV., July
14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt file (discussing the unique approach that the Natural
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water planning process. As noted above, the ESA sheds no light on the
apportionment of diversion reductions or other operational changes among
multiple water diverters on a watercourse.368 Moreover, the ESA requires
its potentially expensive changes at a time when it may already be too late
to help the species survive in any fashion other than in a minor ecosystem
niche.3 69 The same funds or changes ordered prior to a species achieving
the dubious distinction of threatened status could well return far more
"bang" for the environmental buck.
370
A second example of the incoherent integration of environmental
values and the water allocation process involves the uncertain enforcement
of the Porter-Cologne and Clean Water Acts. As noted above, at least
when applied to the Bay/Delta, the ability of the federal government to
force changes in diversions or project operations remains unclear. 37'
Although the State Water Board's broad powers under the 1928
amendment and the public trust doctrine give it apparent authority to adjust
many diversions, it is unclear how the EPA could force a reluctant State
Water Board to force such an adjustment.372
Community Conservation Planning program has adopted which is designed to preserve parcels of sage scrub
habitat to preserve the gnatcatcher rather than focusing on protecting just the individual species). These
intriguing concepts have appeal both for environmental guardians, such as DFG General Counsel Manson, as
well as water users. See Somach, The Endangered Species Act, supra note 198, at 156 (calling for a "'holistic
approach' to habitat designation). On the one hand, a concept so appealing to both development interests and
environmentalists suggests a tremendous idea that should be pursued aggressively as a "win/win" solution. On
the other hand, it is also possible that the different groups have fundamentally different notions of what
"ecosystem" protection entails. Thus, development interests might believe that a less species by species focus
might allow the "sacrifice" of a given individual species, so long as the ecosystem as a whole remained rich and
healthy, under whatever appropriate definition of health. Environmental interests would likely believe that such
an approach would provide more protection to all an ecosystem's species, and protect more habitat than a species
by species approach. In any event, much work.needs to be done on defining the possibilities of such an
approach, including work on its integration into the water allocation system.
368. See supra notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
369. Gregory S. Weber, The Endangered Species Act: New Weapon Enters Sixty-year Fish Fight, 3 RIVERS
276, 282-283 (Oct. 1992) (noting that millions of dollars may be spent on fish screen to save dwindling fish
stocks; same funds spent earlier would have saved many more fish). The most famous example of "heroic"
efforts to save a species is the California condor captive breeding program. See generally Keith Schneider, How
To Map The Best Places For Rare Species, N.Y. TMES, June 3, 1990, at § 4, at 3 (stating that it costs $1 million
a year to save the California condor).
370. In fairness to the ESA, a rational water allocation system might well have a "fail safe" mechanism
such as the ESA that attempted to correct for the consequences of otherwise well thought out but erroneous
planning and allocation decisions. In addition, the very use of the powerful ESA mandates demonstrate that the
other mechanisms within the water allocation system for protection of fish and wildlife values are not
functioning adequately.
371. See supra notes 259-278 and accompanying text.
372. One EPA option involves decertification of the state NPDES authority. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c) (\Vest
1986). This would not solve the Delta salinity or temperature problems, and would force EPA to assume an
expensive administrative chore for which it may not be adequately funded. Another EPA option might involve
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The fifth broad observation follows inevitably from the fourth. The vast
and often bewildering array of applicable laws are administered by an
equally vast and bewildering array of often competing governmental
agencies. For example, in its recent report on public trust matters arising
out of California rivers, the State Public Lands Commission listed forty-
five state and federal agencies that have something to do with the
management or regulation of river resources in California.373 While many
of the listed agencies have only minor or indirect roles to play in
California water policy formation and implementation, the potential for
interjurisdictional confusion and rivalry remains strong. Indeed, as
evidence of the importance of the multijurisdictional nature of California
water allocation, one need look no further than the still developing
relationship of the federal EPA with the State Water Board as it comes to
Bay/Delta water quality planning and implementation.37 4
If the Bay/Delta is any example, it seems that the California water
allocation system and environmental protection laws are not working in the
place where they really matter most. Little concrete has changed in the
fifteen years since the State Water Board issued its Water Rights Decision
1485"l By almost all accounts, estuary dependent fisheries have
declined.376 Similarly, efforts to get additional water export capabilities
have also been largely unsuccessful.3 7 The reluctant marriage of water
allocation and environmental law has mostly produced water policy
gridlock as its offspring. Efforts to break the gridlock range from, on the
one hand, renewed litigation over the substantive law, 378 to, on the other
rejection of § 404 wetlands permits on water quality grounds. Id. § 1344(c) (West 1986). Even if the EPA finds
a legal "handle" to force compliance with its newly promulgated water quality standards, it will likely take years
before the agency has a sufficiently informed staff to enforce its standards intelligently.
373. CALIFORNIA STATE LADs CoMm ssION, CALIFORNIA'S RIVERs: A PUBLIC TRUST REPORT 252-72
(1993). In addition, that report listed the roles of local and regional government agencies, and nongovernmental
citizens groups. Id. at 272-85.
374. See, e.g., supra notes 355, 372 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the EPA's role in
the water allocation process).
375. CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER RIGHTS DECIsIoN 1485 (1978).
376. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Bay/Delta Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 810,
811 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); D-1630 (DRAFr), supra note 82, at 29-44.
377. See, e.g., BULLETIN 160-87, supra note 74,43-47 (listing efforts to augment SWP supplies). See also
BJ. Miller, The Peripheral Canal as a Solution to Delta Problems, I CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y RPm. 87 (Feb.
1991); Sunne W. McPeak, The "Repackaged" Peripheral Canal: Old Soap or New?, 1 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y
RPmE. 87 (Feb. 1991) (separate articles beginning on same page) (discussing the relative merits of "physical
solutions" to the problem of augmenting water diversions while increasing environmental protection).
378. See, e.g., Porgans v. Babbott, Sacramento County Super. Ct. No. 537641 (complaint filed Dec. 7,
1993) (claiming that Department of Water Resources and Bureau of Reclamation have violated the requirements
of their water permits).
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hand, consensus building 9 Given the complexities of the problems and
the enormity of the stakes, the only likely prediction is that the terms of
the legal and political integration of the water allocation and environmental
protection systems will continue to emerge slowly and fitfully as California
approaches the twenty-first century.
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379. EDMUND G. "PAT" BROWN INSTrTUTE OF PUBUc AFFAIRS & WATER EDUCATION FOUNDATION,
ACHIEVING CONSENSUS ON WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA (1992).
